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Abstract
As biometric applications are gaining popularity, there is increased concern over the loss
of privacy and potential misuse of biometric data held in central repositories. Biometric
template protection mechanisms suggested in recent years aim to address these issues
by securing the biometric data in a template or other structure such that it is suitable
for authentication purposes, while being protected against unauthorized access or cross-
linking attacks.
We propose a biometric authentication framework for enhancing privacy and template
security, by layering multiple biometric modalities to construct a multi-biometric tem-
plate such that it is difficult to extract or separate the individual layers. Thus, the
framework uses the subject’s own biometric to conceal her biometric data, while it also
enjoys the performance benefits because of the use of multiple modalities. The resulting
biometric template is also cancelable if the system is implemented with cancelable bio-
metrics such as voice. We present two different realizations of this idea: one combining
two different fingerprints and another one combining a fingerprint and a spoken pass-
phrase. In either case, both biometric samples are required for successful authentication,
leading to increased security, in addition to privacy gains.
The performance of the proposed framework is evaluated using the FVC 2000-2002 and
NIST fingerprint databases, and the TUBITAK MTRD speaker database. Results show
only a small degradation in EER compared to a state-of-the-art fingerprint verification
system and high identification rates, while cross-link rates are low even with very small
databases.
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Abstract
Biyometrik uygulamaların kullanım alanı genis¸ledikc¸e merkezi veritabanlarında tutulan
biyometrik bilgininin mahremiyeti ve olası ko¨tu¨ye kullanımı noktasında endis¸eler art-
maktadır. Son yıllarda biyometrik s¸ablon muhafazası konusunda yapılan c¸alıs¸malar bu
problemleri s¸ablonun kendi ic¸inde veya dog˘rulama mekanizmalarını etkilemeyecek bas¸ka
bir veri yapısı ile izinsiz kullanım ve c¸apraz kars¸ılas¸tırma saldırılarına kars¸ı korumaya
yo¨nelik c¸o¨zu¨mleri kapsamaktadır.
Bu tez c¸alıs¸masında birden fazla biyometrik bilgiyi tek bir s¸ablon u¨zerinde katmanla-
yarak bir c¸oklu biyometrik yapı olus¸turma ve bilgilerin karıs¸ımından faydanlanarak bu
bilgilerin gu¨venlig˘inin ve mahremiyetinin korunması amacı ile bir yo¨ntem sunulmak-
tadır. Bu yo¨ntem kis¸ilerin biyometrik bilgilerini yine aynı kis¸ilerin biyometrik bilgileri
ile korumayı amac¸lamaktadır ve bo¨ylece sadece biyometrik temelli bir c¸o¨zu¨m sunmak-
tadır. Kullanılan yo¨ntem c¸oklu biyometrik bilgiyi is¸leyip deg˘erlendirdig˘i ic¸in geleneksel
tek biyometrili yo¨ntemlere go¨re daha bas¸arılı sonuc¸lar vermektedir.
Sunulan yo¨ntem deg˘is¸tirilebilen biyometrik bilgi ile icra edildig˘i durumlarda biyometrinin
iptal edilebilirlig˘i (yenilenebilirlig˘i) de sag˘lanmıs¸ oluyor. Deg˘is¸tirilebilen biyometrik bil-
giye o¨rnek olarak bu c¸alıs¸mada ses biyometrisi kullanılmaktadır. Kis¸ilerin kendi seslerini
kullanarak kendi belirledikleri bir gizli so¨zcu¨g˘u¨ so¨ylemesi ve bu bilginin biyometrik kat-
mana karıs¸tırılması ile olus¸turulan kayıtlar, ileride kis¸inin bas¸ka bir gizli so¨zcu¨g˘u¨ tercih
etmesi neticesinde deg˘is¸tirilebilir, iptal edilebilir ve yenilenebilir olma o¨zelliklerine de
kavus¸maktadır.
O¨nerilen c¸oklu biyometrik katmanlama yo¨ntemi FVC 2000-2002 ve NIST parmak izi
veri ku¨melerinin yanısıra TU¨BI˙TAK MTRD ses biyometrisi veri ku¨mesi kullanılarak
deneylerden gerc¸iris¸mektedir. Test sonuc¸ları o¨nerilen yo¨ntemin, alanında o¨ncu¨ biy-
ometrik dog˘rulama sistemleri ile kars¸ılas¸tırılınca Es¸it Hata Oranı’nda (EHO) c¸ok yakın
sonuc¸lar elde edildig˘i go¨zlenmektedir. Mahremiyetin korunması noktasında tekli biy-
ometrik bilgi ile yapılan veritabanı saldırılarının ve c¸apraz kars¸ılas¸tırma ile kimlik tes¸hisi
saldırılarının oldukc¸a du¨s¸u¨k sonuc¸ verdig˘i; bo¨ylece sunulan yo¨ntemin beklenilen perfor-
mansı sergiledig˘i go¨zlemlenmis¸tir.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Biometrics is the science of establishing the identity of an individual based on the phys-
ical, chemical and behavioral attributes of the person [5]. The term is derived from
the words “biology” and “metrics”. In todays technology, various biologic attributes
(i.e. biometric traits) have started to be used as biometric discriminators. The grouping
of biometric systems, depending on the type of the trait that its based on, are called
biometric modalities. There are various biometric modalities used in both industrial
products as well as the academic research. In Figure 1.1 various biometric systems built
on different biometric modalities have been depicted.
Biometric modalities are mainly grouped into two types: i) physical/physiological and ii)
behavioral modalities [6, 7]. Physiological biometric modalities depend on the physical
characteristics of the human body and they either don’t change or change very little
with respect to the actions-movements of the subject. On the other hand, behavioral
modalities emerge with respect to the subjects actions. While they also depend on the
physiological characteristics, they still require an action to be detected. A list of different
modalities along with the research work based on the corresponding modaility has been
given Table 1.1. The modalities are given with respect to their types.
Biometric Systems consist of components such as signal acquisition media (eg. finger-
print scanner, camera, iris scanner) for biometric information retrieval, storage media
(eg. databases, smart-cards, secure execution environments) for storing the biometric
1
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Figure 1.1: Various biometric modalities and their applications
Physiological Behavioral
Face [8]
Fingerprint [9]
Fingervein [10]
Palmprint [11]
Ear [12, 13]
Hand Geometry [14]
Iris [15–17]
Retina [18]
Voice [19, 20]
Signature [21–23]
Handwriting [24]
Keystroke [25]
Gait [26]
Table 1.1: Different biometric modalities and the related research work grouped with
respect to their types
information for later use and a biometric feature extraction and decision software that
might be on the sensor, a central server, a smart-card or a device with/without a secure
execution environment.
The use cases for the biometric matching software are either about verifying that a
subject is really who she claims to be or searching the identity of a possibly unknown
subject from a collection of biometric samples (i.e a biometric database) with respect to
the traits that are provided later. The confirmation of a claimer about her identity, given
her biometric sample, is called biometric verification and the identity search against a
database for a subject is called biometric identification. In other words, a person is
verified whether she is the one who she claims to be, or identified via her biometric
information from a database. A sample biometric verification scheme can be a smart-
card based identity verification event where the person inserts her card into the reader
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where the personal information is retrieved, and biometric verification is performed
between the biometric data that is stored in the smart card and the biometric data
that she provides to the sensor attached to the card reader. An example to biometric
identification is the retrieval of a list of suspects from a database with respect to a latent
fingerprint found in a crime scene.
Biometric data is generally processed and converted to a format that is understood by
the decision software prior to being saved in the database. This processing is called
feature extraction and the newly created data is generally called a biometric template.
Some systems purge the original (raw) data after the biometric tempalte extraction since
it will not be used again.
Biometric authentication systems work in two phases: i) enrollment phase and ii) ver-
ification/identification phase. In the enrollment phase the acquired biometric signal is
processed and stored in the target storage medium (smart-card or central database). In
the verification/identification phase the matching of a newly obtained candidate tem-
plate (i.e. probe template) is compared to either the stored template (if the use is known)
or the entire database (if the user is to be found). A sample biometric verification scheme
has been depicted in Figure 1.2.
The matching decision routine compares the probe biometric sample to the template
that has previously been stored in the database and generates a similarity score as the
matching result. After obtaining a similarity score, the two candidate sets are considered
as a match if this score is above a certain threshold. The thresold can be determined by
several experiments on a training set, or may be adjusted with respect to the precision
requirements of the biometric system.
The value of the threshold determines the false reject rate (FRR), which is the probability
for a true user identity claim to be rejected, which is considered inconvenient, and false
accept rate (FAR), which is the probability for a false (impostor) identity claim to be
accepted, and fraud condition to occur [27]. There are also two other complementary
measures, namely genuine accept rate (GAR), which is the probability for a true identity
claim to be accepted and genuine reject rate (GRR), which is the probability of a false
identity claim to be rejected.
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Figure 1.2: A sample biometric verification scheme that consists of two phases: En-
rollment and verification
Biometric system performances may be measured with respect to FAR and FRR values.
Their values tend to increase and decrease inversely due to the changes in the threshold.
Usually, low FAR values indicate high FRR values and vice versa. However, an ideal
biometric system is the one that keeps very low rates for FRR and FAR, and this has
been a challenge for both the academic research and the industry.
It is possible to determine the success (i.e. performance) of a biometric system by
inspecting FAR and FRR values it emits with respect the to varying threshold values.
As mentioned before, when FAR increases, FRR tends to decrease. At a specific point,
these two values cross each other, where they become equal and the equal error rate
(EER) value is observed.
A sample score distribution graph is given in Figure 1.3 as probability density functions
for impostor and genuine verification attempts where the horizontal axis refers to the
value of the score. The point of intersection of the two graphs corresponds to the EER
value. The fraction of the impostor scores that stay above the threshold determine the
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Figure 1.3: An illustration of a score distribution
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Figure 1.4: An illustration of a det curve depicting FAR vs. FRR
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FAR and the fraction of the genuine values that fall below the threshold determine the
FRR value.
A sample DET (Detection error tradeoff) curve that depicts the relation between FAR
and FRR, has been given in Figure 1.4. It can be observed that the two values are
inversely proportional. The 45◦ line is the EER line, intersection of which with the DET
graph is the point where the FAR and FRR values are equal to each other.
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1.2 Motivation
The tremendous speed in the evolution of technology has caused the computers and
networked systems to enter our daily lives. With the increasing use of computers and
networked systems, the identification, authentication and authorization of the system
users have gained a level of extreme importance. As the academic research has advanced,
it has provided users with the ability to use several security and privacy factors (i.e.
personal passwords, tokens, PIN codes, SMS codes, one time passwords, etc. . . ) and
access regions that are restricted to their private posession (e.g online bank account,
personal-work email).
An important security factor that has also been used in such systems is biometric au-
thentication. It is increasingly being employed in authentication and identification of
individuals. It might be considered as either a candidate for replacing the token and
password-based security systems or a brother in arms for those security factors in the
aim of establishing a more solid and secure system.
The usage of biometric data as a security factor is possible after a process called “Ex-
traction”, which involves the removal of unnecessary data and attainment of the useful
data, called “Biometric template”, from the raw (unprocessed) data. In biometric au-
thentication, a questioned biometric template (i.e. probe template) is verified against the
previously registered biometric template (i.e. target template), which has been captured
and stored during the registration (“Enrollment”) phase.
There are two approaches for storing biometric templates during the enrollment phase.
In one alternative, the user carries a smart card containing her biometric template, and
the verification of questioned sample is done within the smart card, without ever being
stored in a repository (i.e. match-on-card). In the second alternative, the enrolled users’
biometric templates are kept at a central repository and authentication is carried out by
matching the query template with the target template stored at the repository. There
are advantages and disadvantages associated with each of these two approaches.
The advantage of the match-on-card scheme is the privacy of the biometric template.
Since the matching process takes place on the smart card, it does not disclose the
biometric data to the outer world. This is valid even if the smart card is somehow
compromised. Since the smart card application is set up not to reveal the biometric
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data during the life-cycle of the card, even if the PIN number is known, or any other
authentication scheme like (e.g. symmetric authentication) is achieved, it provides full
privacy protection for the users’ biometric templates. However, this scheme has some
disadvantages that cause the real life adoption of it to fall short. The most commonly
known disadvantages of this scheme are i) low matching performance due to the limited
processing power and memory of the smart card chip, ii) vulnerability to man-in-the-
middle attacks if the card generates plain matching results, iii) inconvenience of carrying
the card and maintaining its physical security and iv) overhead associated with card
issuance.
The usage of a central repository for the enrolled biometric data overcomes the draw-
backs introduced by the match-on-card scheme. Since the space is not limited, the
processing power is not limited to a simple smart card chip and much more powerful
processing power and memory space can be employed during the verification of a bio-
metric entity. Therefore, the use of central repositories are by far the more common
of the two alternatives; however there is increased concern over the loss of privacy and
potential misuse of biometric data held in central repositories. In this manner, it can
be said, the match-on-card scheme and central repository schemes seem to complement
each other. However, it is technically not convenient to use the two schemes at the same
time since the addressed problem (storing information) is the same for both schemes.
Therefore, the research goes in two diverse directions, i) increase the processing power
of the smart cards or find better algorithms that will require minimal processing power
and high accuracy or ii) finds solutions for ensuring the security of the biometric data
residing on a central server, consequently preserving the privacy of the user and maintain
the ability to use high processing power.
The term security is defined as the computational hardness to obtain the original bio-
metric data from the data saved in the database [28]. On the other hand, the term
privacy is difficult to precisely define, as it has different meanings in different contexts
and cultures. The common denominator can be stated as keeping personal information,
such as one’s actions, whereabouts, or personal information, from others’ view. Within
the biometric domain, loss of privacy occurs if the biometric data is compromised or ac-
cessed to obtain unintended information about a person (such as their health condition).
Loss of privacy also occurs if the biometric data is used to track individuals by linking
biometric databases belonging to different applications. On the other hand, keeping
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biometric data in smart cards has its own problems. In particular, it is not applicable to
remote applications and forgers can claim that their card is broken and avoid biometric
verification altogether.
While the privacy definition is elusive, biometric template protection is seen as a direct
way to address privacy concerns and has been an active research area in biometrics
for the last 10 years. Template protection refers to storing a transformed or modified
version of a biometric template in such a way that it is impossible to reconstruct or
reveal the original biometric template from the stored version. Ideally the protected
biometric template need not be revealed and verification should be done in the protected
template domain. This may be possible with one-way functions that are applied to
both the reference and the query biometrics which allow matching to be done in the
transformed space [29]. While this is a novel idea, finding such one way functions that
are applicable to noisy/fuzzy biometrics has been challenging, along with the need to
register the biometrics before applying the transform. Similarly, the biometric data
can not be directly used as an encryption key within the framework of well-established
cryptographic algorithms because of the noisy/fuzzy nature of biometrics. Providing
cancellability and renewability are two other important properties. Since people can not
change their biometrics as they can change their passwords, if the existing template is
compromised, it should be cancelled or revoked, and ideally a new template is generated
from the same biometric data. A good treatment of these concepts is given in [30].
1.3 Contributions
This thesis is concerned with the privacy protection and security of biometric templates.
Biometric layering is proposed as a solution to this problem and is analyzed both theo-
retically and empirically. For the empirical tests, a state of the art fingerprint minutiae
matcher is implemented to handle the cases where the minutiae orientations are modified
for additional security.
The idea of layering multiple-biometrics has been suggested before [31, 32], although
with limited experimental and theoretical evaluation that would show the viability of
the system.
In this thesis, the mentioned works are extended by:
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• introducing three new methods that aim to i) make it more difficult to separate
the multi-biometric template into its constituent biometric samples (Method2), ii)
prevent the possibility of full leakage of the original template (Method3) and iii)
explore the limits of biometric layering with 3 modalities (Method4);
• presenting new theoretical and experimental evaluation of security and privacy
aspects of the proposed method;
• using state-of-the-art fingerprint matchers for improved results: one commercial
([33]) and the other one being the TPS Matcher as explained in Chapter 3 in
order to work with minutiae locations only (i.e. ignoring the minutia orientation
information), as required in the algorithm;
• performing experiments on large and public databases (all subsets of FVC and
NIST databases, as well as the TUBITAK MTRD Voice Database);
• achieving results that are close to the state-of-the-art verification performance
using the FVC dataset, while demonstrating increased difficulty in cross-linking
databases.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The organization of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, the previous state-of-the art
research on privacy preservation and protection for biometric systems is reviewed. The
enhanced triplet based template matcher called TPS Matcher is described in Chapter
3 by providing experimental results with a common rolled-scanned fingerprint database
(NIST). Then, the Biometric Layering (multi-biometric template fusion) method is de-
scribed for two separate implementations (i) using two fingerprints and ii) using a finger-
print and voice pass-phrase) in Chapter 4 with four different variations in constructing
the multi-biometric templates. The experimental results of the two implementations are
provided and discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Finally, the strengths and weaknesses of
the proposed system and the conclusions are summarized in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Related Work
Several schemes have been proposed in recent years for protecting the biometric tem-
plates [34? –37]: in particular the fuzzy vault [38], fuzzy commitment [35] and biohash
[37] schemes are successfully implemented with many biometric modalities. However,
research is active in finding better methods that provide template protection, while not
inconveniencing the user or degrading system performance.
In one of the earliest works, Tomko proposed the use of biometric data as an encryption
key that would be used to encrypt/decrypt his/her PIN number (of which there can be
many) [39, 40]. In this way, the fingerprint, which uniquely identifies the person, is not
stored in the database, eliminating any privacy concerns. Indeed, this would be ideal
method, however obtaining a unique encryption key from a biometric data, such as a
fingerprint, remains a challenge. Each impression of a fingerprint for instance is slightly
different from another, due to many factors, such as cut marks, moisture, finger being
pressed differently, different sensor types etc., making the task of key generation less
than straightforward.
Ratha et al. [29] suggested a framework of cancelable biometrics, where a biometric
data undergoes a predefined non-invertible transformation during both enrollment and
verification phases. If the transformed biometric is compromised, the user is re-enrolled
to the system using a new transformation. Likewise, different applications are also
expected to use different transformations for the same user. While this work has been
influential, finding one-way transformations that preserve distances has been elusive.
Furthermore, managing the transform functions is also an issue. Those functions must
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either be kept in a smart-card at the user’s possession or in a central database and
protected with a user specific password. In these cases, a stolen card or password and a
stored transformed biometric will lead to compromise. This framework also introduces
the management of transform databases.
Among the practical template protection schemes is the fuzzy commitment, a secure key
release scheme proposed by Juels and Wattenberg [35], which has been inspired by error
correcting codes and has shed light to many research efforts afterwards. Their idea is
based on error correcting codes, where the biometric template is seen as a “corrupted
codeword”. Let c be a randomly selected codeword from a set W of evenly distributed
codewords in a d dimensional space. Then a difference vector δ = t−c is calculated from
a biometric template t and c. Then, the tuple (h(c), δ) is saved as the biometric record
into the database, where h is a hash function. During verification, a probe template t′
is used to obtain a probe word as w′ = t′ + δ. Then c′, the closest codeword to w′ is
selected from W . If h(c′) = h(c) then the verification succeeds. The calculation of the
difference vector and selection of the random codeword has been depicted in figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Random codeword selection and δ calculation in fuzzy commitment
In traditional biometric systems, the information is noisy and thus one cannot create
exactly the same vector at each enrollment. Whereas, in fuzzy commitment, since bio-
metric verification requires a fuzzy match, the two codewords will match if the error is
small. In this sense, it can be thought of as a cryptographic key release scheme.
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Fuzzy commitment is used in several studies. Hao et al. [41] have used iris biometrics
to generate a repeatable and thus reliable cryptographic key up to 140 bits which is
enough to be used in AES-128 symmetric encryption system. Bringer et al. seek for the
best error correcting code and show that two-dimensional iterative min-sum decoding
leads to results near the theoretical limits[42]. The enrollment and verification methods
described in this study are inspired by and modified on the original Fuzzy Commitment.
A random codeword c is selected in a Hamming space H(0, 1)n and saved z = c⊕b in the
database, where b is the biometric template obtained from the user. During verification,
c is decommitted as c = z⊕b′ which is (c⊕b)⊕b′ = c⊕(b⊕b′). If the Hamming distance
dH(b, b
′) is small, recovering c is possible.
Juels and Sudan introduced the scheme called fuzzy vault which is another important
template protection scheme [38]. The fuzzy vault is a general scheme to hide some
data in a vault, such that it can only be released when a sufficiently matching data
is provided; as such, it is very suitable for biometric template protection and indeed
several applications have been implemented using fingerprints [43–46]; face [46]; and iris
[45, 46]. To obtain a fingerprint vault, the minutiae are stored among a large number
of chaff points that are generated to hide the minutiae, such that a user who provides a
certain number of genuine minutiae points can unlock the vault.
Another important method is the Biohash scheme that projects the biometric features
onto a lower dimensional space using a random key [37]. Randomness (and secrecy) of
this key, that can be stored in a user-specific physical token, provides non-invertibility.
Furthermore, matching accuracy increase is also gained, as the biometric signal is com-
bined with an added source of entropy. However, (i) the need to store/access a random
bit string which requires a token (with the well-known disadvantages of token-based
authentication, such as loss, theft, etc. of the cited token) and (ii) the assumption that
the keys are not known, are pointed out as the problems of these schemes [47].
The privacy protection and security methods provided above are focused on a single
biometric modality (mostly fingerprint minutiae). There are also several studies that
make use of multiple biometric modalities in order to create better biometric systems
in terms of privacy protection and/or higher biometric authentication performance. Es-
pecially fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault schemes have been extensively studied on
multi-modal biometrics. We provide some of those works below.
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Nagar et al. propose a framework for multi-modal template protection, which utilizes
secure sketch and feature level fusion of participating biometric traits [46]. The work
outlines building blocks of the framework and demonstrates preliminary implementa-
tions using fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault based template protection for the iris,
fingerprint and face multi-modal system.
Sutcu et al. [48] use fuzzy commitment in a multi-biometric system comprised of finger-
print and face biometrics. They use a method proposed in [49] to obtain a fixed length
feature vector from fingerprint minutia and obtain face features using an SVD based
algorithm. They finally perform a feature level fusion to obtain a combined template
later used in Fuzzy Commitment scheme.
In [31], Yanikoglu and Kholmatov proposed to combine multiple biometrics in order to
increase both privacy and security. Specifically, minutiae points from two distinct fingers
of the same person were superimposed to create a multi-biometric template, which was
shown to be more robust against privacy leaks. They also showed that the system
provides higher level of security as well, because of the multi-biometric nature where the
contribution of multiple biometric data or modalities introduced extra information to the
verification phase, eventually increasing the performance of the overall system. However,
the algorithm they used for verification does not use the orientation information which
has an extreme significance in modern fingerprint matchers.
There exist several studies aiming to increase accuracy by applying fusion, at decision,
score or feature level, with score level fusion being the most common method [9, 50–57].
However, the difference is that motivation in these works is increased security only, not
template protection. In this thesis, we also provide a score level fusion test in parallel
to the proposed method, which is based on feature level fusion, so as to measure the
performance loss introduced to the system due to the fusion of the features.
Brunelli and Falavigna used the hyperbolic tangent for normalization and weighted ge-
ometric average for fusion of voice and face biometrics [51]. These modalities have also
been fused by Ben-Yacoub et al., who considered several strategies such as support
vector machines, tree classifiers and multilayer perceptrons [55]. Kittler et al. have
experimented with fusion techniques of face and voice on the matching score level [56].
Hong and Jain proposed an identification system using face and fingerprint, where the
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database was pruned via face matching before fingerprint matching [58]. The multibio-
metric scheme presented in this thesis will contribute to the literature as it effectively
fuses multiple fingerprints and fingerprint and voice biometrics at feature level and ben-
efits from a second biometric modality to conceal the first one for better cancelability.
The use of multi-biometric templates provides another alternative for template pro-
tection [31, 32, 59, 60]. In this approach, the template is constructed from multiple-
biometrics or one biometric is used to hide another biometric data, rather than using
data hiding or cryptographic techniques.
Yanikoglu and Kholmatov proposed multi-biometric templates in order to increase pri-
vacy as well as security in [31]. They combined minutiae points from two distinct fingers
of the same person using superimposition, creating a template with two biometric lay-
ers. The created multi-biometric template was shown to be more robust against privacy
leaks. While multi-biometric systems were proposed for increased security before [9, 50–
57], to the best of our knowledge, this was the first work that used multi-biometrics for
increased privacy and template protection.
As an extension of this work, Camlikaya et al. combined fingerprint minutiae with a
spoken password [32]. In this way, cancelability was introduced to the system; since the
spoken password can be replaced, if the template is compromised.
Along this line of work, Othman and Ross proposed an approach for creating synthetic
fingerprint images for a person, by mixing complementary phase components of two
corresponding fingerprints [59]. The advantage of this method is that it can be easily
integrated to any existing fingerprint verification system, where the created virtual fin-
gerprints would be used for authentication instead of real ones. Mixing two different
fingers from the West Virginia University database, authors report a rank-1 accurracy
of ∼85% and an EER of ∼6% on a data set with a total of 500 fingers. In another
experiment, they evaluated a property named changeability and showed that the mixed
fingerprints do not match well (30% rank-1 accuracy) with the original ones. To evalu-
ate cancelability, they ran matching and identification tests involving templates obtained
from two impressions of the same fingerprint that were combined with 500 separate fin-
gerprints. They obtained a high 85% identification rate, and 7% EER, showing the
promise of the model, despite having similar templates in the gallery. One issue is
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that to obtain realistic looking fingerprints, their constituents must pass a compatibility
criterion.
In another work combining two fingerprints, Li and Kot propose an approach where
the combined fingerprint template is created using minutiae locations of one of the
fingerprints whose angles are replaced with ridge orientation angles from the other one
[60]. The coupling between the minutiae and their replaced angles is performed after
alignment of both fingers about their corresponding reference points. During verification,
two candidate fingerprints are similarly combined and matched against the template,
obtaining 0.4% false reject rate at 0.1% false accept rate using the FVC 2002-DB2-A
database.
To evaluate privacy of their proposed methods, Li et al. defined two types of attacks
based on their scheme: using the combined template to attack a database that contains
(i) the first fingerprint (using the minutiae location correlation) and (ii) the second
fingerprint (using the minutiae angle correlation). They call the two attacks Attack Type
A and Attack Type B respectively. Using FVC 2002-DB2 A and generating databases
of 100 combined templates, they report low rank-1 rates of 25% for Attack Type A and
57.5% for for Attack Type B, showing the promise of the system. The main issue with
this technique is the need for detecting reference points, which may not exist or be
located reliably. The main benefit of the algorithm is that it theoretically augments
the number of possible enrollments for a person. However, the created template reveals
minutiae locations and may thus be susceptible to cross linking attacks.
Finally, the visual cryptography method that decomposes a private image into desired
number of noise like images (sheets), was applied to protect fingerprint, iris and face
biometrics, by Ross and Othman [61]. When a predetermined number of sheets are
superimposed, the encrypted image is revealed with some degradation in its quality;
otherwise reconstruction is computationally hard. To assure privacy of corresponding
biometrics the use of separate servers that would store constituent sheets is proposed.
As can be deduced, the need for separate servers is the main technical drawback for that
approach.
Chapter 3
Thin Plate Spline (TPS) Matcher
3.1 Overview
Many biometric systems use fingeprint biometrics as their authentication building block.
Fingerprints are shaped by the ridges and valleys that resemble to a stream of regular
liquid flow. This is due to the nature of the fingerprints as the cells that form them are
randomly moved by the amniotic fluid during the fetal phase [62]. The ridges start and
end at different locations harmoniously. These discontinuities of the ridges are called
fingerprint minutiae [9].
There are two types of fingerprint minutiae. When a ridge ends at a certain point and
forms a minutia, it is either forked and two new ridges are emerged from it, in which case
the minutia is a bifurcation, or the ridge is simply finished and there is no continuation,
in which case it is an ending. The fingerprint minutiae also emit other properties such
as their 2D location and the angle of the ridge tangent at the minutia location (i.e.
orientation). Consequently, a fingerprint minutia M is a 4D feature vector such that
M = (x, y, θ, type)
where (x, y) is its location on the 2D coordinate system, θ is the orientation (in radians
or degrees), and type is a boolean (i.e. type ∈ {0, 1}) value indicating an ending or a
bifurcation. A sample fingerpint annotated with two sample minutiae is given in Figure
3.1
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Figure 3.1: A sample fingerprint and two minutae
A common approach for fingerprint minutiae matching is to find the best alignment
between two different minutiae sets and measure the similarity between the two sets
[63]. A simple similarity measure is the number of well aligned minutiae pairs divided
by the number of total minutiae in the two candidate sets. In other words, let A and
B be the two minutiae sets to be verified against each other; then after an optimal
alignment,
Score = 2× |Pairs||A|+ |B|
where |X| is the number of minutiae in set X [31]. Multiplication by 2 ensures a scale
between 0 and 1.
There are also other score calculation techniques, such as using multiplication instead
of averaging [64, 65], introducing additional similarity measures to the overall averaging
fraction [66] and so on.
During fingerprint matching, most modern minutiae based matchers use the orienta-
tion information as a mandatory building block for their algortihm. The commercial
Nuerotechnologia (NT) matcher that was employed throughout this work does not have
a software mode, or a setting to disable the usage of orientation angles. Altough the
orientation information positively contributes to the performance of the matchers, in
some cases that will be explained in the following chapters, this information needs to
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be discarded. This requirement can be satisfied by a minutia matcher does not use the
orientation information and works accurate enough to compensate the information loss.
The triplet based matcher that is proposed by Bazen and Gerez [65] has been chosen
in this thesis as the best fit for the afforementioned requirement, because this novel
approach is based on the comparison of minutiae triplets (triangles that are created
with the minutiae) and does not need the orientation information during 2D point set
registration. While the original study does not use the orientation information, the
method has been improved here so that the minutia orientation information can still
be included in the matcher for extra accuracy. This provides with the flexibility of
enabling/disabling orientation check during tests.
Another novel side of Bazen and Gerez’s work is the way it handles the elastic deforma-
tions that occur on fingerprints. The matcher uses Thin Plate Splines for modelling the
elastic deformations that occur mainly due to the mapping of a 3D surface (i.e. finger
surface) to a 2D plane (the surface of the sensor). The deformations become even more
important when the user accidentally or intentionaly skews her finger in an arbitrary
direction as in Fig. 3.2 during the enrollment.
Figure 3.2: Elastic Deformation Model [1]
While adopting their baseline approach, in order to increase and speed, we provided
improvements and introduced assumptions (e.g assume a maximum rotation of 45n both
sides during fingerprint image acquisition)
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3.2 Mathematical Background
TPS Stands for Thin Plate Spline. It is a 2D analog of 1D cubic splines [67].
A linear transformation of an image can be described with a translation vector, a rotation
matrix and a scaling matrix. The combination of the three matrices introduces an LTI
system (T being Space here rather than time). Consider the following setup:
T =
tx
ty

R =
cos(θ) − sin(θ)
sin(θ) cos(θ)

S =
sx 0
0 sy

Combining all together, we will have an affine transformation matrix that performs the
given operations at once an source points.
AF =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
sx ∗ cos(θ) −sy ∗ sin(θ) tx
sx ∗ sin(θ) sy ∗ cos(θ) ty
0 0 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
The matrix given above can handle any kind of linear transformation as in Figure 3.3.
However the problem becomes more complex when the transformation is not linear. In
other words if there are nonlinear displacements on specific points, then we have to fit
another model that will also handle these nonlinear warps in the grid.
This is where TPS modelling comes into play. When we have n source points called as
landmarks on a 2D function and if we know their exact mapping as n target points called
as targets on another 2D funtion, it is possible to model existing nonlinear deformations
with TPS. In other words, if we warp a smooth surface by moving some artbitrarily
selected points and create a new nonsmooth surface, we could model the deformation via
TPS. In this sense, we define an interpolation between landmarks and targets. Altough
we may not represent the actual underlying function in the new mapping exactly, we
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Figure 3.3: Simple Affine Transform (Only shear)
perform an approximation using TPS modeling. That is why the term Spline is used here.
We are interpolating the predefined destination points so that we get an approximation.
TPS modelling provides an approximation that minimizes the bending energy defined
on a surface as follows:
I(f) =
∫∫
R2
(f2xx + f
2
yy + f
2
xy)dxdy
In other words, we get the smoothest approximation that has one basis vector for trans-
lation, two for affine transform and at most n radial basis vectors that of each are defined
by the landmarks.
The approximation funtion looks like:
f(x, y) = a1 + ax ∗ x+ ay ∗ y +
n∑
i=1
wi ∗ U(|Pi − (x, y)|)
where a1 is translation vector, ax and ay are affine transformations and the rightmost
term is the weighted sum of the nonlinear deformation effect of each landmark on the
current variable (x, y). U(r) = r2 log(r2) is the kernel function - the radial basis function.
The P matrix constitutes of each landmark point as given below, and |Pi− (x, y)| is the
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Euclidean distance between landmark (xi, yi) and (x, y).
P =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 x1 y1
1 x2 y2
...
...
...
1 xn yn
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
The points given as (xi, yi) in the P matrix are the landmarks that cause the deformation
to occur on the source surface. This can be imagined as placing an arbitrary number
of pins on an elastic surface and moving each pin to a different location. If we have at
most three pins, we will obtain an Affine transform. However, for at least four pins, we
get a non-linear deformation and for each new pin, we have to put a new U - (kernel)
into the equation.
As can be seen, the only unknowns in the equation f(x, y) are the weights (wi) of each
non-linear components. We can obtain the unknowns using the Least Squares method.
We know that every landmark has a specific effect defined by the U(r) function, whereas
we do not know how much this effect is.
To calculate the weights, we first have to represent the function in matrix notation and
solve the obtained system. To do this we first define a K matrix as follows:
K =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 U(r12) U(r13) · · · U(r1n)
U(r21) 0 U(r23) · · · U(r2n)
...
...
...
. . .
...
U(rn1) U(rn2) · · · · · · 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
where each of rij is the Euclidean distance between source landmarki, and landmarkj .
We also define
ω =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
w1x w1y
w2x w2y
...
...
wix wiy
...
...
wnx wny
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
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as the collection of weights for each landmarki and
W =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω
T
AF
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
where T is the translation tx, ty and AF is the affine transformation matrix. We also
define the targets as
V =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
xˆ1 yˆ1
xˆ2 yˆ2
...
...
xˆi yˆi
...
...
xˆn yˆn
0 0
0 0
0 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
where each xˆi, yˆi is a point on the destination transformation that corresponds to
landmarki.
Next, we define matrix L as follows:
L =
K P
P T
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
where [P T |0] ∗ W = 0 is the boundary condition for TPS which provides the energy
minimizing factor. Now we are ready to express the function in terms of L, W and V
which is indeed as follows: L ∗W = V . To solve this linear equation, we can invert
the equation: L ∗W = V → W = L−1 ∗ V . Having obtained the W , we decompose it
easily to ω, T and AF . T and AF provide three basis vectors. To compute the degree
of freedom on ω, we can apply Eigen Value Decomposition on W . This will provide us
the actual underlying nonlinear warping vectors. And the eigen vectors will represent
the principal warps. The correspondence between the number of landmarks (n) and
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the number of eigen-vectors (N) is as follows:
n N
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 1
5 2
...
...
m m− 3
The table above implies the fact that, when n ≤ 3 there is no principal warp. But when
n > 3 there should be at most n−3 principal warps. That is because for n ≤ 3 an affine
transformation is sufficient to model the function.
3.2.1 Sample Applications with TPS Modelling
The first sample constitutes of only a shear (See Figure 3.3). In this sample, there
are only three landmarks and three targets. Two of the landmarks move on the same
direction with the same magnitude, whereas one of them moves down. Since we have
three points, there is actually no nonlinear deformation here. The setup is represented
as only a shear.
In the next sample there ware 4 landmarks where 3 of them have been stabilized (i.e.
kept in their position), and one of them moves along a direction. This causes a warp to
occur in the direction of that moving point See Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Three Constant, One Moving points
In the final example only one point remains stationary while others move randomly. The
result is given in Figure3.5.
Figure 3.5: Extreme Warp
3.3 Minutiae Matching Using Thin Plate Splines
Another application of the TPS model, and as anticipated, the actual reason of adoption
of this model is its application to fingerprint minutia matching. The initial work was
proposed by Bazen and Gerez [65], who provided a baseline algorithm to represent the
proof-of-concept. We adopted and improved the algorithm both in terms of its logic
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and implementation to handle larger databases faster. The TPS matcher works in two
pahases, namely Local and Global Matching.
3.3.1 Local Matching
Our algorithm is essentially a 2D point set registration and closest pair counting algo-
rithm. Our points are fingerprint minutia set with their location (x, y) and orientation
(θ) information. In order to find an optiomal alignment between two different point sets
we have to search and find the best alignment (registration) parameters, namely scale,
rotation and translation. This operation is performed during the the local matching
phase in three steps.
Step 1: The minutia neighborhoods for each minutia in the target template (A) and
the probe template (A′) are determined. A neighborhood for a minutia m is
defined as “the triangle that a minutia m creates using two of its close neigh-
bors” (see Figure 3.6). We collect ten neighborhoods for each minutia as fol-
lows: Let {m1,m2,m3, . . .mn} be the neighbors of m in increasing Euclidean dis-
tance, the neighborhoods we choose are {m,m1,m2}, {m,m1,m3}, {m,m1,m4},
{m,m1,m5}, {m,m2,m3} . . . {m,m4,m5}. In fact the number of selected neigh-
bors depends on the performance expectations and computational power. In the
original proposal, the authors use the three smallest neighborhoods. Although
this speeds up the algorithm, the verification performance does not meet the re-
quirements of our multi biometric scheme. We compensated the speed decrease by
modifying the original algorithm to work in a parallel fashion on multicore CPU’s.
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Figure 3.6: A minutia (m) and its five nearest neighbors forming neighborhoods
(triplets-triangles).
Step 2: The neighborhoods of A are locally aligned to those of A′ to obtain local reg-
istration parameters. For each comparison, a t (translation), r (rotation) and s
(scale) triplet is calculated in a least squares manner and the triplet pairs that emit
high alignment error are omitted. Another contribution to the original proposal
is the different technique we apply for triplet pair alignment error measurement.
In the original study, they omit the triplet pairs for which the sum of the squared
distance between the corresponding minutiae locations and the difference of an-
gles of minutiae is above a threshold. In addition to this, we also employ the
geometric definition of triangular similarities to make sure that correct triplets
are aligned. This is achieved by first calculating the Edge-Angle-Edge Similarity
between triplets and ignore the ones that are not similar in the sense of a prede-
fined threshold. Consider the example given in Figure 3.7; where the triangles 4Y
(y1, y2, y3) at the lower left and 4C (z1, z2, z3) at the lower right corner are com-
pared to the triangle 4X (x1, x2, x3) at the top of the figure. By Edge-Angle-Edge
Similarity, we can conclude that 4X ∼ 4Y (i.e. ̂x1, x2, x3 ∼ ̂y1, y2, y3) whereas
4X  4Z (i.e ̂x1, x2, x3  ̂z1, z2, z3).
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Figure 3.7: Three sample triangles compared in terms of Edge-Angle-Edge Similarity
As a result of this step a selected parameter set, that contains the candidate reg-
istration parameters (t, r, s) triples is accumulated.
Step 3: Finally the most voted translation, rotation and scaling values (t, r, s) are
selected from the good parameter set. This is done by running a window for each of
registration parameters. Then all the triplets that stay within the boundaries of the
most frequent registration parameters are selected. The corresponding minutiae in
all the triplets are considered as the matches and they are aligned in a least squares
sense. At this point, we obtain the optimal global affine transform parameters,
and are ready to perform global matching.
3.3.2 Global Matching
After the local matching phase, minutiae pairs are aligned via the optimal registration
parameters. For each minutia in A′ the nearest minutia of A that stays within a radius
of r = 15 pixels is selected to be the match. Here an elimination is again performed
using the angle values of the minutiae if the angles are configured to be checked. Then
the TPS model is applied to A′ where the landmarks correspond to minutiae in A′; the
targets correspond to minutiae in A; and A′ is warped onto A.
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The application of TPS model is as follows:
1. For the landmarks on A′ and the targets on A, a TPS approximation is applied,
as described in Section 3.2.
2. The proximity radius (r) is decreased and the matches staying within the new r
are counted and stored again for a new landmarks and targets set pair.
The above alignment and r reduction procedure is applied in a loop until the number of
the minutiae within the radius for each landmark minutia converges.
The final matching score Stps is calculated over the number of matches n as follows:
Stps =
n2
|A| ∗ |A′|
The advantage of applying the TPS Model is that it provides more robustness by han-
dling the elastic deformations. Since Bazen et. al. performed bad quality fingerprint
image elimination, providing results in comparison to their original proposal will not be
healthy. However, in order to provide measurement of the contribution of TPS Model
to the system, we provided a baseline implementation called the Rigid Matcher, that
uses the same procedure in the local matching phase and differs in the global matching
phase by only counting the matches for the landmark minutiae within their r = 15 pixel
proximity for once (i.e. does not apply any TPS modelling).
Below we have provided figures for a Rigid Matcher vs. TPS matcher comparison. The
figures belong to two imprints of the same subject taken from the NIST Fingerprint
Database (See section 5.2). i) A figure with two non-aligned fingerprints given in Figure
3.8, ii) an alignment is done using the Rigid Matcher in Figure 3.9, and iii) another
alignment performed via the TPS Matcher in Figure 3.10. It may be seen that in the
TPS modelled matching scheme, the points are registered better.
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A
B
Figure 3.8: Non-Aligned fingerprints
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A
B-RIGID
Figure 3.9: Fingerprints aligned using Rigid Matcher
A
B-TPS
Figure 3.10: Fingerpints aligned by using TPS Matcher
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We performed a test on the NIST Fingerprint Database (See section 5.2) to measure the
improvement of TPS Modelling by comparing the Rigid Matcher to the TPS Matcher.
The selection of the NIST database was because the fingerprints in this database are
rolled-scanned, which implies that we expect high amount of elastic deformations com-
pared to a regular database such as FVC. We created a genuine test set of 2000 records
and a forgery test set of ∼100000 records.
The Rigid Matcher and the TPS Matcher performed an EER of 4.5% and 4.3% respec-
tively. The experiment showed the superiority of TPS Modelling for handling the elastic
deformations in fingerprint matching. The EER/FAR/FRR values of this test have been
provided in Table 3.1. A ROC plot that shows the difference between the TPS matcher
and the Rigid Matcher is given in Figure 3.11. We also provide the verification and
identification performances of the TPS matcher in comparison to the commercial NT
Matcher in Section 5.4.2.
Matcher ERR FAR FRR
Rigid Matcher 4.5 3.0 6.0
TPS Matcher 4.3 2.7 6.0
Table 3.1: Error rates obtained from the Rigid vs. TPS Matcher on the NIST Fp.
Databese
TPS Matcher 33
0,80
0,82
0,84
0,86
0,88
0,90
0,92
0,94
0,00 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,03
GA
R
FAR
Rigid	matcher
TPS	Matcher
Figure 3.11: An ROC plot displaying the GAR-FAR performance of the Rigid
Matcher and TPS Matcher
On a 4-core CPU, our TPS matcher has an average matching speed of 3 ms/match, (i.e
a frequency of 330 matches/second).
Chapter 4
Biometric Layering with multiple
biometrics
4.1 Overview
In this thesis, we propose a multi-biometric authentication framework to increase se-
curity of the biometric system and as well as the privacy of the enrolled biometric
templates. The framework is based on feature level fusion of multiple biometric tem-
plates represented as fingerprint minutia. The main principle of the framework is to
conceal the biometric of a person using another biometric, rather than a cryptographic
construct to protect the constituent modalities.
In particular, we demonstrate two implementations of the proposed framework: one,
combining multiple fingerprints and another one, combining one or two fingerprints
along with a spoken password (voice biometric). With the latter implementation, one
further obtains a cancelable template that can be renewed/reissued by simply uttering
a different password.
As will be seen in Chapter 5, the proposed method, called Biometric Layering, is robust
against privacy leaks and achieves a higher level of security due to its use of multiple
modalities, in comparison to corresponding unimodal systems.
The proposed scheme consists of combining multiple biometric modalities into a sin-
gle multi-biometric template, concealing the constituent biometrics within each other.
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While the main aim is to protect the biometric data, the scheme also enjoys increased
security for the overall system due to the multi-modal biometric paradigm. It can also
be used to create different biometric templates for different security applications, by
combining different constituent biometrics (e.g. two different fingerprints) for each ap-
plication or by using behavioral biometrics that can be changed for each application
(e.g. a spoken password). The scheme is based on the fact that without possession of
genuine biometric data, it is computationally hard for a forger to separate the combined
template into its constituent layers. Moreover, additional modification on the source
template such as randomizing minutia angles and randomly deleting some minutia cre-
ates a securer multi-biometric template, at some cost in performance.
In one of the implementations shown in this thesis, two fingerprint minutiae sets are
superimposed to form a multi-biometric template comprised of two biometric layers. In
the second implementation, the first layer is obtained from a fingerprint and the second
layer from voice, providing cancellability for the created templates. Furthermore, three
biometrics are layered (three fingerprints or two fingerprints and a voice template) to
explore the capacity of the proposed system.
The overall workflow of the system can be defined in two phases; namely Enrollment
and Verification. In the Enrollment phase, the acquired biometric signals are processed
and each one is converted into a set of feature points (e.g. minutia points of fingerprints)
and mixed together to create the multi-biometric template. In the Verification phase,
the user is verified when she presents query samples of each of the constituent biometric
modalities; whose features are matched and removed from the multi-biometric template,
each match resulting in a match score.
The matching scores obtained at each step are then linearly combined to obtain a final
matching score. The overall process is depicted in Fig. 4.1.
The implementation is explained in detail for the case of multiple fingerprints in Section
4.3, and for fingerprints with a spoken password in Section 4.4. The fusion method for
both cases is the same except for voice (as well as any other possible modality other than
fingerprints) where an additional phase of conversion of the raw biometric to fingerprint
minutiae takes place. The newly created template is called voice minutiae.
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 Minutiae Extractor 
Minutiae Extractor
Multibiometric Template 
Construction
A
B
Minutiae Matcher-
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the proposed system.
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4.2 Symbols
The symbols provided in this section are used consistently from Chapter 4 until the
end of the thesis, in order to assist the reader with the coherence in the terminology.
Symbols that are not included below, are explained immediately before they are used
the their context. The list of symbols is given below.
• A: First minutiae set obtained from a fingerprint during enrolment.
• B: Second minutiae set obtained from a fingerprint during enrolment.
• Σ: Multi-biometric template created: Σ = A ∪B.
• A′: Second impression of the first fingerprint used in query.
• B′: Second impression of the second fingerprint.
• ∆: The remaining template after removing the first layer: ∆ = Σ−A′
• SNT : Proprietary integral score returned by the NT matcher. It has a minimum
of 0, a threshold value that mostly occurs on the range [0− 50] and no maximum.
It represents the similarity between two different templates.
• STPS Fractional score obtained from the match with ∆ vs. B′, using the TPS
matcher (Section 4.3.2).
• SHD Hamming distance score obtained from ∆ vs. B′, when B and B’ are voice
minutia (see Section 4.4.2).
• T (SNT ) A hyperbolic tangent function used for normalization of SNT to the range
[0− 1) so that it can be fused with STPS to obtain the final score (Section 4.3.2).
• Method1: Template construction with the superimposition of two minutiae sets.
• Method2: Template construction method with the superimposition of two minutiae
sets where the second minutiae set is assigned pseudo-random angles.
• Method3: The proposed method, same as Method2 except for using only 75% of
the minutiae from the first template (A).
• Method4: Same as Method1 except for using 3 fingerprints and 75% of each minu-
tiae set.
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4.3 Multi-biometric templates using multiple fingerprints
4.3.1 Enrollment
In order to achieve a successful enrollment, a person provides impressions from two dif-
ferent fingers, (i.e. A and B). Minutiae points defined by ridge endings and bifurcations
on the fingerprint pattern are used as features (see Section 4.3.1.1). Then, the center of
masses of the two minutiae sets are aligned and one set is superimposed on the other so
as to minimize the number of the overlapping minutiae (see Section 4.3.1.2). Therefore,
the created multi-biometric template (Σ) consists of two biometric layers and becomes
the biometric ID/template of the person, stored into the database.
A sample biometric template is shown in Fig. 4.2, where the two distinct fingerprint
minutiae templates A and B, given in a) and b) form the multi-biometric template. In
c), the template Σ is obtained using superimposition (Method1). In d), the template Σ
is modified so as to hide the angles of B (Method2). In e), the template Σ is modified
so as to randomly contain only 75% of the minutiae of A (Method3). ’’ is used for A
and ’ ’ is used for B, but this information is only for visual depiction only and is not
stored in the final template.
4.3.1.1 Feature Extraction
We extract and use minutiae points as the features representing a fingerprint. In our case,
we only keep the 2-dimensional coordinates and the ridge orientation of a minutiae point,
while other systems may use more information, such as the type of the discontinuity.
In the literature, there are several methods proposed for the automatic extraction of
minutiae points [71, 72], which commonly follow well-known image enhancement, bina-
rization, thinning and detection steps. This process can sometimes result in spurious
minutiae; hence it is also common that minutiae points found through image processing
operations are later verified using various post-processing techniques [73]. After minutiae
extraction, minutiae alignment and matching steps are performed for two fingerprints.
In this process, the main challenges are partial-overlap between two fingerprints and
the non-linear deformation of the fingerprint that unevenly alters minutiae positions.
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6 Yildiz et al
a) Minutiae set A b) Minutiae set B
c) Σ construction in Method1 d) Σ construction in Method2 e) Σ construction in Method3
Fig. 2 Two distinct ﬁngerprint minutiae templates A and B, given in a) and b) form the multi-biometric template. In c), the template Σ is obtained
using superimposition (Method1). In d), the template Σ is modiﬁed so as to hide the angles of B (Method2). In e), the template Σ is modiﬁed so as
to randomly contain only 75% of the minutiae of A (Method3).? is used for A and? is used for B, but this information is only for visual depiction
only and is not stored in the ﬁnal template.
5.4 Hiding Angle Information
Considering that it may be possible to separate the minutiae
of Σ into their corresponding source sets using the coher-
ence of minutiae angles within local regions [9], we pro-
pose an alternative method for template generation. In this
method, we use an extra step wherein the minutiae angles
of the minutiae set B are replaced to mimic those of A. This
method enhances the privacy of the user since it should be
more difﬁcult to separate the two ﬁngerprint templates A and
B apart.
In this method (called Method2 from now on), in addi-
tion to the template creation step given in 5.3, we take the
following steps to replace the orientation angles of the B’s
minutiae:
For each minutia m of B in Σ :
1. Find the minutia of A within an arbitrarily chosen prox-
imity of 30 pixels to m and create a histogram of their
angles (L).
2. Quantize the angles of the minutia in L to 8 directions
and ﬁnd the most frequent quantized angle q.
3. Set m’s angle to a random angle in the range [q-22.5,
q+22.5] (A total range of 45’ corresponding to 8 direc-
tions).
The perturbation is done so as to reduce the chances of
clustering minutiae points of the same source ﬁngerprint us-
ing minutiae angle coherence.
The multi-biometric template obtained in this way is shown
in Fig 2.d. Note that this template is similar to the one gener-
ated by Method1 (shown in Fig 2.c) except for the modiﬁed
angles of the second minutiae set.
Figure 4.2: Sample multi-biometric templates
Please see Chapter 3 where a matching algorithm t at handles non-linear deformati ns
has been provided.
Since the aim of this thesis is t demonstrate the concept of multi-biometric security and
privacy, we pr ferred to use a commercial, state-of-the-art fingerprint minutiae extractor
[33]. I this way, we can demo strate real life feasibility of the proposed concept, while
avoiding errors due to a sub-optimal feature extrac ion system. Af e th extra ti n
proces , all of the informatio , except the coord at s and ridge angles of the minutia
(e.g. cor typ and location), re discarded in order to get minutiae only templates.
4.3.1.2 Multi-biometric Template Generation
The creation of a multi-biometric template (Σ) is a simple analytic process where the two
minutiae sets (A and B) are mixed with respect to their x, y coordinates. The important
issue in creating the multi-biometric template is that the constituent biometrics should
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not be easily separated. In order to merge the two minutiae sets as much as possible,
we follow these steps:
• Create an empty template that will include both A and B
• To minimize the number of overlapping minutiae in Σ, we translate B with respect
to A by 50 pixels in each of the four directions. The translation amount was
decided to allow some flexibility, while still overlapping the majority of the two
minutiae sets.
• Superimpose the two minutiae sets (A and B) with respect to the optimal transla-
tion found in the previous step and store that combined point set as the combined
multi-biometric template (Σ).
A sample multi-biometric template generated using this procedure is shown in Fig. 4.2.c,
for two minutia sets shown in 4.2.a-b. This method forms the first and simpler template
creation method (called Method1 from now on).
4.3.1.3 Hiding Angle Information
Considering that it may be possible to separate the minutiae of Σ into their corre-
sponding source sets using the coherence of minutiae angles within local regions [74], we
propose an alternative method for template generation. In this method, we use an extra
step wherein the minutiae angles of the minutiae set B are replaced to mimic those of
A. This method enhances the privacy of the user since it should be more difficult to
separate the two fingerprint templates A and B apart.
In this method (called d Method2 from now on), in addition to the template creation
step given in 4.3.1.2, we take the following steps to replace the orientation angles of the
B’s minutiae:
For each minutia m of B in Σ:
1. Find the minutiae of A within an arbitrarily chosen proximity of 30 pixels to m
and create a histogram of their angles (L).
2. Quantize the angles of the minutiae in L to 8 directions and find the most frequent
quantized angle as q.
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3. Set m’s angle to a random angle in the range [q-22.5, q+22.5] (A total range of
45’ corresponding to 8 directions).
The perturbation is done so as to reduce the chances of clustering minutiae points of
the same source fingerprint using minutiae angle coherence.
The multi-biometric template obtained in this way is shown in Fig 4.2.d. Note that this
template is similar to the one generated by Method1 (shown in Fig 4.2.c) except for the
modified angles of the second minutiae set.
It important to note that the previous studies [31, 32] don’t make use of minutiae
orientation information during the verification step and therefore ignore this information.
However, most modern minutiae based biometric systems use this information.
4.3.1.4 Using a Subset of the Minutiae
Modifying the angles of the second the fingerprint (B) makes it more difficult to isolate
constituent fingerprints; something that could be done with some success, by considering
minutiae angles [74]. However the minutiae of the first fingerprint (A) are used as is, in
the multi-biometric template. Therefore, after a successful verification, this fingerprint
is exposed to the system, to a large extent (except for extra and missing minutiae points
resulting from an error-prone matching of the first template (A).
To remedy this situation, in this section we propose a new method called Method3 that
is identical to Method2, except for the fact that it only uses a subset of A’s minutiae.
In the experiments (see Chapter 5), we have tried using 50% and 75% of the minutiae
points, with acceptable verification performance being obtained with the latter.
4.3.1.5 Layering Three Fingerprints
In order to explore the capacity of biometric layering, we propose a new method,
Method4 that combines three fingerprints into one multi-biometric template.
In this method, 75% of the minutiae points in each fingerprint is used so as to prevent
full leakage of any of them during a successful match. Since an attack in the form of
separating the three fingerprints using minutiae orientation angle coherency, is deemed
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very difficult if not impossible, the minutiae angle orientations are kept intact, unlike
Method2 and Method3.
The tests for Method4 are performed only with the FVC database, as the NIST database
fingerprints contain very large number of minutiae points (average of 195 minutiae points,
compared 32 in FVC database), so that combining three of them is not feasible.
4.3.2 Verification
When a subject is to be authenticated, she gives two query fingerprint impressions (A′
and B′) (and a third one as C ′ in case of Method4). These impressions are matched
against the combined template Σ. The matching is done by finding the correspondence
between the minutiae of these two query fingerprints and multi-biometric template Σ:
Each query fingerprint is successively matched to and subtracted from the multi-biometric
template. At each subtraction step, a matching score is obtained. Finally, all the match-
ing scores are linearly fused to obtain a final matching score. The person is authenticated
if the fusion of the scores obtained from the two steps is above a certain threshold. This
process is depicted in Figure 4.3.
In Step 1, the Neurotechnology Fingerprint Matcher (NT Matcher) is used for matching
A′ against Σ. The proprietary match score SNT is obtained for this first match and the
matching minutiae are then removed from the template, unleashing ∆:
Σ vs. A′ −→ SNT
Σ−A′ −→ ∆
Step 2 continues with furthermore processing of ∆ to produce the second ingredient of
the final score (i.e. the TPS Matcher Score). The remaining template ∆ is matched
to B′ using the TPS Matcher having been adjusted to ignore the orientations of the
minutiae during the matching procedure. In fact, this is the reason for using different
matchers for the two steps; the NT Matcher depends on minutiae angles for its successful
performance, while the minutiae of the second fingerprint are modified in Method2. The
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Figure 4.3: Verification Process
STPS score is calculated to measure the success of this second step.
STPS =
√
|∆ ∩ B′|2
|∆| ∗ |B′|
The |∆ ∩ B′|2 is the the square of the number of matching minutia between ∆ and B′
In the final step (Step 3 ) the final score is obtained by linearly combining the two match
scores after normalizing SNT , to bring it to the same scale with STPS :
S = α ∗ STPS + T (SNT )
T (SNT ) =
(
2
1 + eσ∗SNT
− 1
)
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While the combination is essential to bring together all the sources of information, the
accuracy is not very sensitive to the weighting coefficient α, and we have obtained the
reported results with α = 1.
In Method4, the final score is the average of three matching scores from the NT matcher.
4.4 Multi-Biometric Templates Using Fingerprints and Voice
4.4.1 Enrollment
During the enrollment phase, the user submits a fingerprint and utters her selected
password, from which minutiae points and voice minutiae are extracted respectively.
The main steps of the enrollment and verification stages are similar to the case of two
fingerprints (see 4.3), except for their implementations. In particular, the extraction
of the voice features from which voice minutiae are generated, as well as the template
generation and matching stages, are described in the following sections.
4.4.1.1 Feature Extraction
The features employed in speaker recognition systems should successfully be able to
define the vocal characteristics of the speaker and distinguish it from the voices of other
speakers. Short spectra of speech signals give information about both the spoken words
and the voice of the speaker.
Short-time spectral analysis is the most common way to characterize the speech signal
[75]. Although, wide range of possibilities exist for parametrically representing the
speech signal for the speaker recognition task, such as Linear Prediction Coding (LPC),
perceptual linear predictive (PLP) codes [76] or maximum likelihood linear regression
(MLLR) coefficients [77], Mel-Frequency Cepstrum Coefficients (MFCC) are perhaps
the best known and most popular voice features used in speaker recognition. MFCC’s
are based on the known variation of the human ear’s critical bandwidths with frequency
[78]. Due to their representation capability and simplicity, we use the MFCC features of
the enrolment pass-phrase, and use them in one layer of the multi-biometric template.
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After all the spoken passwords are collected from the speakers, each utterance of every
speaker is divided into 25ms frames with 10ms overlap and cepstral analysis is applied
to each frame. As a result, each 25ms frame is represented by a 13 dimensional vector
< c1, ..., c13 > consisting of MFCCs.
Since speech signals can vary in length, each password is then aligned with a Hidden
Markov Model (HMM) of the corresponding password, in order to determine the corre-
spondence between individual frames and phonemes. The HMM used for this alignment
is obtained by concatenating previously trained, speaker- and text-independent phoneme
models corresponding to the phonemes of the password. This way, each frame in each
utterance is identified as one of the phonemes that may occur in the utterance of the
passwords.
The global phonetic Hidden Markov Models used for the alignment are 3-state mono-
phone phonetic models which have previously been trained using voice samples collected
from various users. After this alignment, frames which correspond only to the middle
(2nd) state are kept while the first and final (1st and 3rd) states of phonemes are deleted.
This step is done to reduce the effects of noise and speech variations.
At this point, mean vectors of cepstral coefficients for each phoneme are calculated by
averaging the 13 dimensional vectors representing the frames within the same phoneme
(middle state). Hence, the nth segment (middle state of a phoneme) is represented by a
13-dimensional mean vector Fn. During the training and testing phases for the system,
mean vectors of the phonemes will be used instead of single frame vectors. The feature
extraction process is shown in Fig. 4.4.
In order to finish the feature extraction phase, the aligned voice features are binarized
by thresholding them using a global threshold depending on the gender of the claimed
speaker. The threshold is chosen such that approximately equal number of zeros and
ones occur in the binarized feature vector. When there are multiple training utterances
for a person, a single binary feature vector is obtained by majority voting of all binary
feature vectors extracted from all utterances.
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Figure 4.4: Feature extraction through HMM alignment of the MFCC features.
4.4.1.2 Minutiae Generation
For combining the voice features with the fingreprint minutiae, ”voice minutiae”, the
points on the 2D Euclidean space, similar to fingerprint minutiae, are extracted. To
achieve this task, the binarized voice features are divided into groups of 16 bits. Each
group is then divided into two 8 bit numbers, namely (x, y), defining a point on the 2D
plane. This point set comprises the voice minutiae. The voice minutiae generation from
the binary voice feature is shown in Fig.4.5.
Binarized MFCC String︷ ︸︸ ︷
10100111︸ ︷︷ ︸
x1
01101001︸ ︷︷ ︸
y1
00111010︸ ︷︷ ︸
x2
10100111︸ ︷︷ ︸
y2
01001010︸ ︷︷ ︸
x3
01001011︸ ︷︷ ︸
y3
. . .
−−−−−−→ {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), (x3, y2), . . .}
Figure 4.5: Transformation of the binarized MFCC feature into voice minutiae.
4.4.1.3 Multi-biometric Template Generation
The obtained voice minutia is scaled to match the width and height of the primary
template and then combined with it as described in Section 4.3.1.2, with the fingerprint
minutiae being A and the voice minutiae being B this time. The scaling step here is
important; because the dimensions of the voice minutiae ranges in [0-255], while the
fingerprint minutiae coordinates may span a different, typically larger, range. Scaling
thus guarantees that the voice minutia distribution is in the same range as the fingerprint
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minutiae. Since we already know the size of the fingerprint templates, the scaling step
is trivially undone during matching phase.
Since voice minutiae have no angle information, pseudo angles are assigned instead, as
described in Section 4.3.1.3, in all methods. As a result, there is no Method1. On the
other hand, Method2, Method3 and Method4 are exactly the same as with fingerprints
except for the fact that voice minutiae is used instead of the last fingerprint.
4.4.2 Verification
During authentication, the user gives her fingerprint/s and utters the claimed person’s
password, which are then matched successively to the stored template. This scenario is
a variant of the matching method explained in 4.3.2. The verification process is depicted
in Figure 4.6.
In Step 1, the minutiae matched to the first fingerprint from Σ are deleted. This is
done exactly the same way described in Section 4.3.2. For Method4 this subtraction is
repeated for the second fingerprint as well, and the remaining minutiae in ∆ are matched
to the minutiae obtained from the query utterance. NT fingerprint matcher is used to
match and remove the matching minutiae from Σ:
Σ vs. A′ −→ SNT
∆ = Σ−A′
In Step 2, the remaining voice minutiae are transformed back into 8-bit binarized MFCC
features, to match them to the feature vector obtained from the query password. For
this, the coordinates of ∆ is transformed (scaled down to) ∆s, to undo the original
scaling, using:
W = Width(A), H = Height(A)
sx =
256
W
sy =
256
H
∆s = ∆ × (sx, sy)
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Figure 4.6: Verification Process for FP+Voice
In Step 3, the minutia coordinates of ∆s (i.e. the (x, y) pairs) are bitwise concatenated
as x|y to obtain 16-bit sequences for all the minutiae in ∆s. Note that since the relative
order of these voice minutiae points are lost, every 16-bit sequence obtained from ∆ is
compared to every 16-bit sequence in B′ using Hamming Distance and the sequences
that emit the smallest distance are marked as a match. A distance of at most 3-bits of
Hamming distance is considered a match and the ratio of the number total matches to
the total number of the voice minutiae in ∆ and B′ form the matching score of this step
(SHD). For this matching phase, the Hamming distance is used, since the Euclidean
Distance is not meaningful for comparison of bit strings.
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SHD = ∆s vs. B
′
Step 4 consists of the calculation of he final score S as a linear fusion of SHD and the
normalized SNT ’s obtained from the first step.
S = α ∗ SHD + T (SNT ).
Chapter 5
Evaluation
5.1 Overview
In this chapter the proposed multi-biometric layering method and its four different vari-
ants (Method1−4) are evaluated in terms of their verification and identification perfor-
mances, along with some measures of privacy enhancement. The method is implemented
using two main models: i) multiple fingerprints and ii) fingerprint + voice and evaluated
with four types of tests given below:
1. Uni-modal System Performance: These tests are performed to assess the
baseline performance of matching algorithms employed in the proposed scheme,
when applied to a single modality. Their results are compared against the multi-
biometric tests in order to measure the performance enhancement of the proposed
methods.
2. Multi-modal Verification with the Proposed Scheme: These tests measure
the verification performance of the proposed schemes, where two query biometric
samples (A′ and B′) are matched against the claimed multi-biometric template as
described in Section 4.3.2.
3. Multi-modal Identification with the Proposed Scheme: In order to explore
the identity discovery capabilities and the privacy protection power of the proposed
scheme against attacks, genuine identification as well as identity search attacks
(e.g. latent fingerprint attack) against a biometric gallery are applied with the
50
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expectation of identification rates to be high and low for genuine and impostor
searches respectively.
4. Multi-modal Score Level Fusion: Bio-layering method is based on the feature
level fusion of the multiple biometric modalities represented as fingerprint minu-
tiae. While it provides privacy and performance enhancements compared to a
uni-modal biometric system, the feature level fusion of the biometric information
is expected to introduce information loss compared to a multi-biometric system
where the information is not mixed and is used separately. In order to evaluate
the performance loss in this case, a multi-modal verification system based on score
level fusion is implemented utilizing the same feature extraction and matching
algorithms with the proposed system.
Using the results of the above evaluations, it is demonstrated that in terms of technical
performance, as defined by Simoens et al. [30], the proposed framework achieves in-
creased accuracy and privacy due to multi-biometric verification and encounters only a
two-fold degradation in storage requirements and throughput, compared to the case of
using a single biometric template, as a direct consequence of verifying two biometrics.
5.2 Databases
5.2.1 Fingerprint Databases
Three different fingerprint databases are used for evaluating the proposed system. First
two databases are the FVC 2000 [2] and 2002 [3] databases, which are commonly used,
including the public fingerprint verification contests. Each of these two databases con-
sists of 4 subgroups (namely DB1, DB2, DB3, DB4), where each subgroup consists of
880 images (subjects(11) x fingers(10) x impressions(8)).
Sample images taken from FVC2000 and FVC2002 data sets are depicted in Figures 5.1
and 5.2, respectively. The properties of each subgroup for FVC databases are outlined
in the Table 5.1.
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FVC 2000 FVC 2002
NIST
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4 DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
Sensor Type
Low-cost
Optical
Low-cost
Capacitive
Optical Synthetic Optical Optical Capacitive Synthetic Rolled&Scanned
Image Size 300x300 256x364 448x478 240x320 388x374 296x560 300x300 288x384 512x512
Num. Images 11 subjects × 10 fingers × 8 impressions 2000x1x2
Resolution 500 dpi 569 dpi 500 dpi
Table 5.1: Fingerprint databases used in this thesis (FVC 2000,2002 and NIST).
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Figure 5.1: FVC2000 Sample images of four subgroups of FVC2000 [2].
Figure 5.2: FVC2002 Sample images of four subgroups of FVC2002 [3].
The third data set used in the evaluations is the NIST’s fingerprint database-4 [4]. In
this database there are a total of 2000 subjects, where each subject has provided 2
impressions of only a single finger.
The main purpose of using the FVC databases is to measure the verification perfor-
mance of the proposed method and compare it to the state-of-the-art, whereas the
NIST database is used for the identification and cross-linking tests, as it includes more
subjects compared to FVC data sets. Please see Section 5.4.4 for further details.
5.2.2 Voice Database
The voice tests are performed using TUBITAK’s speaker database [79]. The database
is comprised of two subsets that differ by the types of the uttered phrases.
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Figure 5.3: Two sample fingerprints from NIST fingerprint database-2 [4].
The first subset is the Fixed Password Set (FPS), which consists of 106 people (27
female and 79 male) all uttering the same numerical phrase 16 times. The phrase has
been uttered as two three-digit numbers (815-364) both spoken in Turkish. The average
number of voice minutiae obtained from this password set is 24; while the minimum
and maximum number of voice minutiae obtained from the fixed password uttered by
different people are 24 and 26, respectively.
The second subset, called the Private Password Set (PPS), consists of the same 106
subjects. In this set, each speaker has uttered his/her own name and surname 16 times
(same names were replaced with a randomly selected different name). The average
number of voice minutiae obtained from this password set is only 10, which is much
smaller than the number obtained from the 6-digit fixed password string. This indicates
that the names are much shorter on average, with the minimum and maximum number
of voice minutiae obtained from the private passwords when uttered by different people
are 7 and 18, respectively.
All utterances have been recorded in TUBITAK’s semi-anechoic recording rooms utiliz-
ing the Roland UA-100 USB speech processing unit at 44100 Hz and 16-bit resolution
in silent conditions.
Since the number of the minutiae points obtained from the voice data is small compared
to the fingerprints, the fixed and private passwords of the users are employed in con-
catenation as well, to obtain longer voice samples. This set is referred to as Combined
Password Set (CPS), in Tables 5.9 and 5.8.
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FPS PPS
Language Turkish
Content ”815-364” Subject’s first and last name
Num. Subjects 107 106
Num. Samples 107 subjects × 16 recordings 106 subjects × 16 recordings
Table 5.2: Voice databases used in this work (TUBITAK Speaker Database).
5.3 Template Security and Privacy Evaluation
Using the biometric criteria defined in [30], the following claims that are explained here
or in the subsequent experiments can be made:
• Full-leakage irreversibility: refers to the difficulty of determining, exactly or
with tolerable margin, from the multi-biometric template, the biometric sample(s)
or features used during enrolment to generate that template. Full-leakage irre-
versibility cannot be guaranteed with Method1, as it may be possible to use minu-
tiae angle coherence, using techniques similar to ones used in [80] to reconstruct
the fingerprint image from minutiae angles. On the other hand, for Method2 and
Method3, where the minutiae angle of the second template is modified, this re-
quirement is satisfied as it is not feasible to split the multi-biometric template into
its two constituent fingerprint minutiae sets since there are too many combinations
to try in the abscence of other information such as minutiae angles; and there is no
way to verify that a successful split has been achieved. With these two schemes,
the minutiae angle of the second template matches that of the first template lo-
cally, thus eliminating the potential use of minutiae angle information for finding
the right split; or recovering the second template at all.
Altogether there are C(2N,N) potential splits of the multi-biometric template into
two equal parts, where N is the average number of minutiae in a single template.
Hence the probability of finding the correct split is 1/C(2N,N). This number is
roughly 0.56× 10−18 for N = 32 which is the average number of minutiae in FVC
fingerprint databases.
Moreover, in addition to modifying the angles of the second template (namely B),
Method3 randomly deletes a quarter of minutia in A while creating the multi-
biometric template. Thus, both templates are modified in this method and it is
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impossible to fully recover any of the individual templates. Since there will always
be an uncertainty about the leaked information about the constituent biometrics
even if the right split was found, the irreversibility is unconditional, according to
the definition of [30].
As for Method4, since only a portion of each of the constituent minutiae sets is
used, it is guaranteed that there is no full leakage.
On average, only 55% of the minutiae points in the first matched template (A)
are correctly identified during the verification step, as measured over the FVC
dataset using Method2 with two fingerprints. This is partly due to usual matcher
errors and also the existence of the second template. Hence, it can be said that
the original templates are not revealed fully, even after a successful matching step.
Nonetheless, Method3 is suggested to prevent this situation with certainty (all of
minutiae points will not be revealed in full to the system that may potentially be
unreliable.
• Authorized-leakage irreversibility: refers to the difficulty of determining a
biometric sample or features from the multi-biometric template, that would be
useful for an attacker to break into an unprotected system (i.e. an unprotected
uni-modal system).
The probability of one of the random splits to have K or more of its constituent
minutiae points coming from the same fingerprint, when splitting a template with
N points, is:
P (K) =
N∑
k=K
(
N
k
)
pk × (1− p)(N−k)
where p is 0.5. This probability is 0.0035 for N=32 and K=24 (if 75% or more of
the minutiae in the chosen set is required to be correct); but drops sharply as K
approaches N , as listed in Table 5.3.
K P(K)
24 0.003500
25 0.001050
26 0.000270
27 0.000057
28 0.000010
... ...
Table 5.3: Probability P (K) of K or more correct minutiae points in a given random
split, for N = 32.
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• Revocability is best seen as an aspect of operational performance that can be
achieved by removing a compromised template from the system or by blacklisting
it [30]. In this sense, the proposed system provides revocability.
• Unlinkability is demonstrated via cross-link tests involving templates sharing one
of the constituent biometric samples and differing in the other (e.g. Σ = A + B
versus Σ′ = A′ + X). Moreover, uni-modal identification tests are done by cross-
linking with an unprotected database (e.g. Σ = A + B versus A′). Genuine
identification rates are also reported as comparison. It is desirable for the system
to obtain high genuine identification rates, while obtaining low cross-link and uni-
modal search rates.
• Renewability refers to the ability to generate new templates from a biometric
sample, in order to renew a revoked template. In this sense, renewability is avail-
able when the method is used with voice features; since the user can enrol with
a new pass phrase to renew his/her biometric template. When the user provides
a new pass phrase with a new impression of the subjects previous finger, it must
be hard to link the new template to the old one. The cross-link tests given in
Table 5.9 with different voice templates provide a measure of how different the
new template is from the revoked one. The low cross link rate (33%) shows that
generating a new multi-biometric template by just changing the voice pass-phrase
is quite successful. Renewability does not directly apply to the FP-FP method as
the number of fingerprints of an individual is limited.
5.4 Evaluation Results Using Fingerprints (FP-FP)
5.4.1 Uni-modal Verification Results
The uni-modal verification performance results of the fingerprint matchers used in the
proposed framework are reported here in order to establish the baseline performances
of both the TPS matcher and the selected commercial fingerprint matcher from Neu-
rotechnology (NT ) [33].
The reason for utilizing this particular commercial matcher is two-fold. First of all, it
demonstrates the adaptability of the proposed framework to already available systems.
Evaluation 58
The other reason is that the NT has demonstrated a successful performance at FVC-2000
and 2002 evaluations, making it a good candidate to compare against. In particular,
the average EER values reported for NT in FVC 2000 and 2002 are 1.37% and 0.99%
respectively. The evaluations in this thesis show similar results for this matcher.
For these tests, all of the available impressions of genuine fingerprints are used in
FVC2000 and FVC2002 databases. Since there are 110 different fingers and 8 impres-
sions per finger in each database (11 persons × 10 fingers), matching all impressions of
the same finger to each other results in 28 genuine tests per finger. This gives a total of
3080 (= 110× 28) genuine tests for each FVC group. As for forgery tests, for each FVC
group, every first impression of all the fingers is matched to the first impressions of all
the other fingers, resulting in 5995 (= 110× 109) forgery tests.
The top two rows of Table 5.4 indicate the NT and TPS matcher performance on the
FVC and NIST databases, with an average EER value of 1.9% versus 3.7% for the
FVC databases, respectively. The NT system has state-of-the-art performance and the
TPS matcher has a moderate performance and is included here for completeness. In the
proposed system, the TPS matcher is only used when the NT matcher does not perform
well; namely when matching minutiae sets for which the angles are modified.
In that case, performance results are lower as expected: the average EER increases by
about a factor of two for each database, becoming 7.5% and 9.7% for the FVC and NIST
databases, respectively. The results for the case of modified angles are not reported for
the NT system as it does not have an option to disregard the minutiae angle information.
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Methods
FVC 2000 FVC 2002
FVC Avg. NIST
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4 DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
UMV-NT 2.4 1.1 4.7 1.6 0.7 1.4 2.1 1.4 1.9 2.8
UMV-TPS 3.6 2.3 7.1 5.1 2.0 1.8 5.2 2.8 3.7 4.3
UMV-TPS-NAI 8.8 5.8 13.3 7.3 4.5 4.4 10.0 6.3 7.5 9.7
MMV-Method1 0.9 0.1 1.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 1.9 0.4 0.5 4.6
MMV-Method2 3.6 1.0 5.0 1.8 0.6 0.3 3.1 1.1 2.1 9.0
MMV-Method3 5.1 2.1 7.6 4.1 2.3 0.8 5.8 3.3 3.9 12.2
MMV-Method4 3.8 2.9 5.3 3.1 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.0 3.4 -
Table 5.4: Verification performance (% EER) with FP-FP layers.
Methods
FVC 2000 FVC 2002
FVC Avg. NIST
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4 DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
Multi-modal SLF 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.3 1.2
SLF (NAI) 0.8 0.4 3.2 1.2 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.8 1.0 1.8
Table 5.5: Verification performance (% EER) of a multi-biometric system with score level fusion.
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5.4.2 Multi-modal Verification Results of the Proposed Scheme
The lower part of Table 5.4 reports the verification rates for the proposed scheme where
multi-biometric templates are created with two fingerprints, using all four methods de-
scribed in Section 4.3. Method1 constructs the template by simple layering, while in
Method2 and Method3 the minutiae angles of the second constituent fingerprint are
replaced, with or without using all the minutiae points, respectively. Finally, Method4
explores the capacity of biometric layering by combining three biometrics into one multi-
biometric template.
For these tests, a gallery of 55 templates is created for each FVC subgroup, by pairing
each two consecutive template into one multi-biometric template. As for the NIST
database, it is possible to create a gallery of 2000 multi-biometric templates by following
the same strategy used for each FVC subgroup. However, to accomodate cross-link tests
as well, a gallery of 2000/3=666 templates was created to be used in verification tests.
As can be seen in Table 5.4, using Method1, the proposed method provides a 0.5%
average EER over the eight FVC datasets on average, which is significantly better than
the state-of-the-art uni-modal performance of the NT system.
Using Method2 that provides higher template security, the results are close to the state-
of-the-art uni-modal performance, with 2.1% average EER on n the FVC database.
With Method3 and Method4 that trade verification performance for additional template
security, the results are 3.9% and 3.4% average EER on the FVC datasets, respectively.
For all three methods, there is a significant decrease in comparison to the uni-modal
systems, when using the NIST database. This can be explained by the fact that the
fingerprints in the NIST database typically contain a very large number of minutiae
points (195 versus 32 in FVC databases, on average), which causes a higher number of
minutiae collision during multi-biometric template creation. Method4 was not tested
with this database, because it was not deemed suitable due to the large number of
minutiae points in the fingerprints in this database.
Although, there is performance degradation when using Method2 and even more in
Method3, compared to Method1, the minutiae angle replacement and additional random
removal of minutiae from the first template provide a stronger template security and
resilience to privacy threats, which is discussed in Section 5.4.4.
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An observation was that in the first match (Σ vs. A′), on average, 92% of all matched
minutiae are correct, while 8% of the matched minutiae come from the second finger-
print, as calculated over the FVC datasets using Method2. On average 55% of the
minutiae points in A are correctly identified. Hence, the first match performance can be
summarized as 0.92 precision and 0.55 recall.
DET plots for the performances of the three methods are given in Figure 5.4, along with
uni-modal systems. In order to facilitate a better comparison of the performances of
NT to Method2 and Method3 on FVC-2000 and FVC-2002, DET graphs are provided
Figures 5.4-a,c and 5.4-b,d respectively. It can be observed from these two figures that
the proposed schemes provide a verification performance comparable to the state-of-the-
art uni-modal performance of the NT system.
As reported, the multi-modal matching performance forMethod1 are higher thanMethod2
and Method3 for all different FAR vs GAR data points.
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Figure 5.4: DET Plots for the uni-modal and suggested multi-biometric system with
FP-FP layers for FVC 2000 in (a,c) and FVC 2002 in (b,d). For ease in comparison,
corresponding plots share the same color, with different markers.
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5.4.3 Multi-modal Score Level Fusion
For the sake of completeness and comparability with other multi-modal approaches, a
multi-modal verification system using a simple score level fusion is also implemented
using the TPS Matcher. Everything in this system is done the same way as for the
proposed system whenever applicable. For instance the same feature extraction and
matching algorithms are used as in the proposed system. During matching, two alterna-
tives are tested in line with the proposed method: using the minutiae angles or ignoring
them. In either case, the match score between two fingerprint templates is calculated
as the ratio of the matched minutiae in the reference fingerprint. The individual scores
obtained from the two matches are linearly combined for the final decision.
The EER results shown in Table 5.5 are the lowest error rates for both the FVC and NIST
databases, with 0.3% and 1.2% EER, respectively. The success of the fusion system is
as expected, because on one hand it benefits from twice the discrimination power of two
fingerprints (i.e. the multi-biometric nature) and on the other hand, it does not sacrifice
anything for the sake of privacy and template security. The performance degradation
that comes with the lost angle information in the fusion system (1.0 versus 0.3% for
FVC) parallels that observed with the proposed schemes.
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GID UMS Cross Link Search
Σ vs. (A′, B′) Σ vs. A′ Σ vs. B′
Σ = (A+B)
vs. (A′ +X)
Σ = (A+B)
vs. (X +B′)
Method1
Top-1 93 75 75 21 32
Top-5 93 75 75 37 39
Top-10 93 75 75 38 39
Method2
Top-1 82 74 40 20 10
Top-5 85 75 46 33 16
Top-10 86 75 51 34 19
Method3
Top-1 79 58 48 1 37
Top-5 82 59 55 5 47
Top-10 83 59 60 6 50
Table 5.6: Identification and cross-link results for the NIST gallery consisting of 666 multi-biometric templates with FP-FP layers.
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GID Uni-Modal Search Cross Link Search
Σ vs. (A′, B′) Σ vs. A′ Σ vs. B′ Σ s. C ′
Σ = (A+B)
vs. (A′ +X)
Σ = (A+B)
vs. (X +B′)
Σ = (A+B + C)
vs. (A′ +B′ +X)
Method1
Top-1 99 93 92 - 82 85 -
Top-5 99 94 93 - 84 86 -
Top-10 99 95 95 - 87 88 -
Method2
Top-1 97 96 81 - 85 5 -
Top-5 98 96 82 - 87 16 -
Top-10 98 96 96 - 90 29 -
Method3
Top-1 96 83 74 - 53 6 -
Top-5 98 86 81 - 60 16 -
Top-10 98 87 87 - 67 30 -
Method4
Top-1 100 76 77 77 - - 63
Top-5 100 78 80 79 - - 68
Top-10 100 80 83 82 - - 75
Table 5.7: Identification and cross-link results for the FVC gallery consisting of 55 multi-biometric templates with FP-FP layers (36 Templates in
Method4).
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5.4.4 Template Security and Privacy Test Results
Irreversibility, revokability, and renewability issues were addressed theoretically in Sec-
tion Section 5.3; here the results of three types of tests are reported to demonstrate
unlinkability, by showing decreased success in cross-link rates in comparison to genuine
identification rates:
• Genuine identification-Σ vs. (A′, B′): The aim of this evaluation is to measure
the genuine identification rate of the system, when the multi-biometric template is
searched using a genuine pair of query fingerprints within a gallery of templates.
The identification is performed by sequentially matching the query pair to each of
the multi-biometric templates in the gallery, using the method described in Section
4.3.2.
• Uni-modal search attack-Σ vs. A′, Σ vs. B′ or Σ vs. C ′: This attack measures how
easily one can identify a person’s template having only one matching fingerprint.
Since the roles of all the fingerprints used in the template are not symmetric, the
scenario is evaluated separately for the first, second and third templates, using the
commercial NT matcher. Searching with the third template (C ′) is only mean-
ingful for Method4 where the multi-biometric template consists of three layered
fingerprints and the attacker has access to an imprint of the third fingerprint.
• Cross-link attack-Σ = (A + B) vs. Σ′ = (A′ + X) or Σ′ = (X + B′): This is an
attack scenario where the attacker is assumed to have access to two different multi-
biometric databases and would like to find corresponding identities. During this
attack, each multi-biometric template of a database is matched to all templates
of the other database, as if they are uni-modal templates. In this attack scenario,
corresponding templates may share the first fingerprint (A) or the second finger-
print (B), as in the two uni-modal attack types. Cross-link attack is also used
to measure how different a new template is from a revoked one if the secondary
template is a voice pass-phrase.
Identification of a correct template with only a single fingerprint is undesired, as it
would lead to the identification of the user by searching with a latent fingerprint, or
cross-linking with an unprotected database. Similarly, if a user is enrolled in multiple
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databases, cross-linking may identify which templates in the two databases belong to
the same person, posing a privacy threat.
FVC and NIST databases are used throughout these evaluations, with results given in
Tables 5.7 and 5.6. While both databases are commonly used in the literature, they
both present some challenges for these tests. The FVC database is very small to run
multi-biometric tests (especially cross-link tests), while the NIST fingerprints contain
very large number of minutiae points, which is not very amenable for the proposed
method. Nonetheless, all the tests are included for both databases as applicable, with
the only exception that Method4 is omitted on the NIST database.
To maximally use the NIST database, the 2000 fingers are grouped such that 3 fingers
are used as if they belong to the same user. The two fingerprints (A and B) of one
user are used to construct one multi-biometric template for the main gallery, for which
the matching impressions (A′ and B′) are used for genuine identification and uni-modal
search tests. Then, a third fingerprint (X) from another user is used to create two
matching galleries (A′ + X and X + B′). In this way, a total of 2000/3=666 multi-
biometric templates are obtained in the three matching galleries.
Since there are only 11 subjects and 110 different fingers in each of the FVC subgroups,
the genuine identification and uni-modal search attacks are run with a gallery of 55
templates, obtained by pairing fingerprint pairs (i.e. two-by-two), for each subgroup.
For cross-link tests, the fingers are paired in triples (i.e. 3-by-3 such that 3 fingers are
used as if they belong to the same subject), as was done for the NIST database. In this
way, a very small gallery of 36 templates is obtained.
As an evaluation metric, the percentage of cases where identification returns the correct
template among the top-k candidates is reported for top-1, top-5 and top-10.
During the fingerprints matching tests, the state-of-the-art NT matcher is used whenever
possible, in order to obtain the most competitive results; however this matcher performs
poorly when the minutiae angle is missing. Hence, the TPS matcher is used when
angle information is missing or altered; namely in matching B and B′, in Method2 and
Method3.
For the larger NIST gallery, genuine identification rates of 93%, 82% and 79% are
achieved using Method1, Method2 and Method3 respectively, showing the premise of the
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scheme for providing high identification performance. The genuine identification rate
decreases as expectedly as more information is omitted in the template creation. The
genuine identification rates are not very high, since fingerprints in the NIST database
typically contain a very large number of minutiae points (195 on average), which is not
very suitable for layering. However, results are comparable to the rank-1 identifica-
tion rates (∼85% and ∼83%) reported in [59], obtained using a similar and alternative
multi-biometric template creation scheme and a similar size database.
The uni-modal search evaluation that tests whether a multi-biometric template database
can be searched with a single fingerprint, results in low identification rates as desired.
When the test is carried out with an impression of the first constituent fingerprint (A′),
the top-1 results are 75%, 74% and 58%, using Method1, Method2 and Method3 respec-
tively. Compared to genuine identification rates, there is about 20% points difference
between genuine and uni-modal identification rates, for Method1 and Method3.
Uni-modal search with the second fingerprint achieves roughly the same rate as for the
first fingerprint using Method1, as the two fingerprints have a symmetric role in this
method. However the top-1 identification rates drop even further, to 40% and 48%, using
Method2 and Method3, respectively. As discussed before, with these two methods, the
minutiae angles of the second fingerprint are modified to match the angles of the first
fingerprint, when constructing the multi-biometric template.
Finally, both types of cross-link evaluations result in very low identification rates end
up in low success rates, 20% and 10% using Method2 and 1% and 37% for Method3,
supporting the claims that the proposed methods are strong against cross-linking attacks.
As for the FVC gallery, genuine identification rates are very high (99, 97, 96 and 100%
for the four methods), as shown in Table 5.7. However, uni-modal identification rates
are also very high except for Method3 and Method4. For these two methods, it can be
observed that the uni-modal identification rates (83% and 74%) are significantly lower
compared to genuine identification rates, as desired.
Cross-link rates are also low in this database; in particular for Method3, a 53% rate is ob-
tained when the first fingerprint is shared among the two corresponding multi-biometric
templates and 6% when the second fingerprint is shared. Method4 that combines three
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fingerprints obtains even higher genuine identification rates and lower uni-modal search
and cross-link rates (77% and 63% top-1 rates, respectively).
In summary, the results show that Method3 obtains significantly lower uni-modal search
rates compared to genuine identification rates, as well as very low cross-link rates for
both databases. While not applicable in all applications and databases, Method4 obtains
even better results, with higher genuine identification rates and lower cross-link rates.
5.5 Evaluation Results of Multi-Biometric Templates Us-
ing Fingerprint and Voice
In this section, verification performance results of the system that combines fingerprint
and voice templates are reported, so as to demonstrate applicability of the proposed
framework to other biometric modalities and to demonstrate cancelability. Being a
behavioral modality, the utilization of the voice biometric has the advantage of rather
simple revocation if compromised and almost unlimited number of realizations due to
the fact that user can have as many spoken passwords as she wishes to have.
For the evaluations, the FVC 2000-A fingerprint database discussed in Section 5.2 was
combined with TUBITAK voice data subsets discussed in Section 5.2.2. For each voice
subset, a gallery of 100 multi-biometric templates was generated, by pairing one voice
sample of each user with a fingerprint from the FVC 2000-A database and repeating
this for the whole database. This gallery is used in genuine identification tests, as well
as uni-modal search tests.
In addition, two other galleries were created to be used in cross-link tests with the
first gallery. For each multi-biometric template in the first gallery (A + B), a different
fingerprint is combined with another utterance of the same voice sample used in the
template, to obtain the template (X + B′) in the second gallery. Similarly, another
impression of the fingerprint used in the template in the first gallery is combined with a
different voice sample to obtain the matching template (A′+X) in the third gallery (See
Section 5.4.4). Since Method4 contains three biometric layers, where two of them are
fingers and one is voice, the galleries generated for Method4 contain 55 multi-biometric
templates.
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5.5.1 Uni-modal and Multi-modal Verification Results
The first two rows of Table 5.8 show the uni-modal verification performances of the
Hamming distance based matcher (see Section 4.4) using only the voice minutiae and
the Neurotechnology’s matcher using only fingerprint minutiae, as the two components
of the multi-modal system. The NT system using the fingerprint minutiae has a similar
performance to what was obtained in Section 5.4.1, where another pool of fingerprints
from the same dataset was used. Since, the same fingerprints are combined with all
the multi-biometric galleries, the matcher performance is the same (2.1%) for all. With
12.1% and 8.7% and 7.8% accuracies on the three subsets, the verification results using
voice features are roughly comparable with state-of-the-art speaker verification results.
Note that during conversion of the voice templates to voice minutiae, the order of the
actual bytes in the voice template are lost, necessitating that the Hamming distance
comparison is performed in a brute force manner, which in turn leads to sub-optimal
registrations.
Method Modality FPS PPS CPS
Hamming Voice 12.1 8.7 7.8
NT Fingerprints 2.1
Method2 Both 1.9 1.6 2.0
Method3 Both 4.8 1.9 4.0
Method4 Both 3.0 3.0 3.0
Table 5.8: EER percent results for verification tests using fingerprints and voice.
Verification results for the multi-biometric system are shown in the last two rows of
Table 5.8. The system obtains less than 2% EER with the three voice database subsets
for Method2. The error rates almost double with Method3 that does not use all of the
fingerprint template; but drop to 3.0% for all subsets, using Method4. It is also impor-
tant to note that the performance obtained for the second subset (Private Passwords) is
better than the first subset (Fixed Password Set) where everyone utters the same string
and the only distinguishing part is the vocal characteristics of the user.
In summary, the proposed multi-biometric template scheme implemented with a finger-
print and a voice password, obtains an improvement over both of the uni-modal systems
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and comparable to those obtained with the implementation with two fingerprints. How-
ever the real benefit with this case is the renewability of the multi-biometric templates
constructed with voice pass-phrases that can be easily changed.
5.5.2 Template Security and Privacy Test Results
To evaluate privacy enhancements, it important to apply identification tests (genuine
identification and attacks) on the the fingerprint + voice case see ’Multi-modal Identi-
fication with the Proposed Scheme’ in Section 5.1. The databases for this test are con-
structed using FVC fingerprint databases and TUBITAK voice database as described in
Section 5.2.2.
As can be seen in Table 5.9, top-1 genuine identification rates are very high for all three
methods with 99% for both methods, as desired. As for the uni-modal searches, identi-
fication rates drop to 95% for Method2 and 88% for Method3, when the fingerprint (A
′)
is used as query. The uni-modal search with voice (B′) obtains even higher identification
rates of 89% and 91%, using Method2 and Method3, respectively. The drop between
genuine and uni-modal identification rates are small for Method2 and moderately good
(around 10%) for Method3; however it is expected that as the gallery size increases,
uni-modal identification rates would drop much faster than genuine identification rates.
Method4 that combines two fingerprint and voice shows the best results, with 99% gen-
uine identification rate and only around 65% uni-modal search rate using fingerprints,
and 77% using voice as the query.
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GID UMS XLNK
Σ vs. (A′, B′) Σ vs. A′ Σ vs. B′ Σ vs. C ′
Σ vs Σ′
w/ different Voice
Σ vs Σ′
w/ different FP
Method2
Top-1 99 95 89 - 83 65
Top-5 99 95 95 - 87 85
Top-10 100 95 99 - 88 88
Method3
Top-1 99 88 91 - 33 72
Top-5 100 89 99 - 39 89
Top-10 100 90 99 - 43 93
Method4
Top-1 99 64 66 77 33 11
Top-5 100 66 68 95 48 30
Top-10 100 69 70 98 59 52
Table 5.9: Identification and Cross-Link results with a gallery consisting of 100 multi-biometric templates with fingerprint-voice layers. A and A′
refer to fingerprint impressions and B, B′ and C ′ are voice minutiae (FP+PP).
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As for cross-link rates, both Method3 and Method4 achieve a very low rate of 33% when
the templates share a fingerprint and differ in the voice sample. This means that the
voice data indeed works well to hide the original fingerprint template. The cross-link
rate is higher for Method3 (72%) when the voice sample is shared (last column); but
it is still significantly lower than the genuine identification rate in this case. However,
notably this is a less likely scenario as the voice is expected to be different in different
galleries. The ROC plot for these tests is given in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5: ROC Plots corresponding to Table 5.8 (FP=Fixed Password, PP=Private
Password, FP+PP=Concatenated voice).
5.6 Entropy and Information Leakage Analysis
The proposed multi-biometric template fusion methods described in this thesis are ana-
lyzed in terms of biometric system performances (i.e. verification and identification). It
is also important to provide an information theoretical perspective on the claimed privacy
protection scheme. This is achieved by calculating the entropy of the multi-biometric
templates and comparing them to the randomly generated counterparts. Since the fo-
cus of this thesis is to show that multi-biometric templates that are generated with the
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proposed scheme possess high entropy values, a rather simple and comparative approach
has been taken.
A fingerprint template is divided into a grid of d× d pixels sized cells. The probability
of the grid cell i to be occupied by at least one minutia is estimated by considering all
the records in the dataset, as:
P (Yi = 1) =
n(i)
N
where n(i) is the number of times grid cell i is found to contain at least one minutiae,
over the total number of considered templates N. The random variable Yi takes on value
1 if there is at least one minutia in grid cell i; 0 otherwise.
A sample template divided into a grid is given in Figure 5.6. For a template of size
W ×H, the total number of grid cells:
S =
W ×H
d2
Figure 5.6: A sample template divided into a grid of d× d sized cells.
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Assuming independence between Yi and Yj , the Shannon Entropy of the fingerprint
template is estimated as:
H(Y ) =
S∑
i=1
P (Yi = 1) log2 P (Yi = 1) + P (Yi = 0) log2 P (Yi = 0)
It should be noted that the entropy value depends on the value of d and we believe that
a value between 10 and 20 may give a reasonable coarse estimate for the true entropy.
As the main focus here is the change in entropy with respect to different templates (e.g.
random vs. actual), a relatively simple approach has been employed.
The entropy analysis is performed on the FVC 2000-a and NIST datasets. The FVC
dataset contains 55 records, whereas the NIST dataset contains 1000 records. Each
record in a dataset is a vector {A, Ar, Σ, Σ′, Σr}, where A is the primary template
and Σ is the multi-biometric template (i.e. Σ = A ∪ B). Ar and Σr are minutiae
templates that contain randomly generated minutiae (chaff points) having the same
number of minutiae as their counterparts A and Σ respectively. Σ′ is a multi-biometric
template Σ′ = A + Br where Br is a randomly generated template having the same
number of minutiae points as B (i.e. the secondary template). The estimated entropy
vales are provided in Table 5.10, The absolute entropy values have been provided in the
upper part, and the differences are provided in the lower part of the table. For instance
for d = 20 we report the entropy of a single biometric template and a multi-biometric
template as 108 and 220 respectively. For comparison, Ratha et. al report entropy for
a fingerprint template of 30 minutiae to be around 100 bits [81].
The aim of the analysis is to estimate the randomness of the actual fingerprint templates.
To achieve this, the entropy values of the actual fingerprint templates are compared to
the random counterparts. In other words, we focus on the entropy differences. In
particular, Ar − A estimates the randomness of a single minutiae template, Σ′ − Σ
measures the contribution of the secondary template (B) in terms of randomness, and
Σr −Σ provides information about the randomness of a multi-biometric template. The
differences are important because they provide a measurement of the information leakage
that might occur in a template compared to its random counterpart.
It can be seen that the entropy difference between the random data and the actual
fingerprint data is mostly below 10%. The differences increase with respect to the
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FVC NIST
d (pixels) 1 5 10 15 20 1 5 10 15 20
A: 206 191 160 131 108 1034 737 552 439 357
Ar: 206 195 169 143 120 1043 769 585 473 392
Σ: 450 387 294 220 160 2010 1312 932 696 511
Σ′: 452 398 312 240 182 2028 1346 967 733 555
Σr: 452 403 316 246 188 2036 1359 980 749 575
Ar −A (bits) 0.3 4.1 9.0 11.7 12.6 8.9 31.5 33.4 33.9 35.6
Ar −A (%) 0.1 2.1 5.3 8.2 10.5 0.9 4.1 5.7 7.2 9.1
Σ′ − Σ (bits) 1.4 11.4 18.2 20.0 22.6 17.9 34.1 34.6 37.4 43.8
Σ′ − Σ (%) 0.3 2.8 5.8 8.1 12.0 0.9 2.5 3.5 5.0 7.6
Σr − Σ (bits) 1.6 16.4 22.5 25.5 28.1 25.9 46.4 48.5 52.9 63.4
Σr − Σ (%) 0.4 4.1 7.1 10.4 15.0 1.3 3.4 4.9 7.1 11.0
Table 5.10: Estimated entropies according to different grid cell sizes (d× d)
increasing d values (i.e. larger cells). This can be explained by the fact that while a
random template can have minutia at almost any location, the minutia tend to be closer
to the center of the mass in an actual template due to the shape of the finger impression.
The Ar−A values have been provided for comparison to the Σ′−Σ and Σr−Σ values. The
closeness of the Σ′−Σ values to the Ar −A values implies that the information leakage
caused by the inclusion of the secondary template is ignorably small when d = 1, 5, 10, 20
for FVC, and even decreased for d = 15 for FVC, and d = 5, 10, 15, 20 for NIST. On the
other hand, the Σr −Σ values are close to Ar −A, implying that the randomness of the
multi-biometric template is sufficiently close to a single template.
Consequently, it can be stated that the proposed multi-biometric template protection
method provides sufficient security of the constituent templates, hence protecting the
privacy of the users.
5.7 Time Cost for Enrollment and Verification
The enrollment and verification phases take different amount of time for processing.
Since the enrollment phase includes image processing steps as well (e.g. extracting the
minutiae from the raw image), it takes much longer than the verification.
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However, as the feature extraction process has been declared to be out of scope of this
thesis, the enrollment times reported here include only the multi-biometric template
creation from two existing minutae templates and the feature extraction costs are left
out.
The multi-biometric template creation process takes 300ms for the FVC DB and 1s
for the NIST DB. The matching process takes less than 10ms with the FVC DB for
Method1, and up to 50ms for Method2 and Method3; and for the NIST DB it takes
less than 50ms for Method1, and up to 500ms for Method2 and Method3. Note that,
while verification times are longer than the commercial uni-modal system, they are still
acceptable for use in a commercial application.
While the multi-biometric template creation process is fast, it is not regarded as the bot-
tleneck of the system as it will be done rarely for a biometric system. On the other hand,
for traditional fingerprint based biometric systems where the impressions are static (i.e.
not rolled-scanned) the average number of minutiae (∼ 32) allows quite fast matching
1s ( 1000 matches/second), which in turn proves that the system is suitable for both
verification and identification scenarios. However, this speed decreases as the average
number of the minutiae in a template increases, yielding a 10ms ( 100 matches/second)
matching time and speed. Consequently, it can be summarized that although the algo-
rithm provides high accuracy matching performance as shown throughout this chapter
and is fast for small sized templates, it might need to be improved in terms of speed for
larger templates such as the ones of the NIST DB.
Chapter 6
Summary and Conclusion
6.1 Summary
This thesis proposes and evaluates different variations of the suggested multi-biometric
template construction method. The discussions about the relative merits of these varia-
tions, based on results observed on the FVC datasets are given below. These observations
apply to the NIST database for the most part as well.
Using two fingerprints, Method1 (first proposed in [31]) has very good verification rates
that are better than the state-of-the-art fingerprint verification rates of the NT matcher
(see Table 5.4) and its genuine identification rate is high, but its uni-modal search
rates are also high (see Table 5.7). Furthermore, since the two fingerprints are layered
without extra precaution, there may be a possibility of separating the two fingerprints
using minutiae angle coherence.
As the methods try to protect the template more (Method2 and Method3), verification
and identification rates fall, but unimodal search and cross-link rates also decrease as
desired. In particular in Method3, which is the suggested layering method for two
fingerprints, the average verification rate for the FVC databases is quite good (Table
5.4) and the unimodal search (Table 5.7) and cross-link rates (Table 5.6) are very low
as desired. Considering that the gallery sizes used for uni-modal search is very small
and cross-link tests identification rates are already very low, the significant difference
between these rates and the genuine identification rates show the potential of the method
in increasing biometric privacy.
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Finally, in Method4, three different fingerprints are combined and even better results
than Method3 are obtained. Hence, if the application is suitable, at the cost of some
inconvenience to the user, this is the proposed method. However due to a large number
of minutiae in the template, this method is not suitable for applications requiring very
low false accept rates (Fig. 5.4).
As for the fingerprint and voice combination, the best results are obtained when a longer
voice pass-phrase is used (combination of fixed-password and user’s name), as expected.
In this case, all methods obtain better verification results compared to only unimodal
verification with voice (see Table 5.8), while Method3 also has low cross-link rates as
given in (Table 5.9).
As with three fingerprints, combining two fingerprints and a voice pass-phrase, as done
in Method4 is the most successful and suggested method, if the application allows for
the use of three modalities.
For the NIST database where the fingerprint templates contain an excessive number of
minutiae points, identification and cross link rates are lower in general compared to the
FVC database. Hence, while genuine identification rates are not as high as desired, cross
linking rates are very low.
The NIST database wasn’t used in fingerprint and voice combination, because the rela-
tively small number of voice minutiae (average 19 per template) compared to the large
NIST templates (average 195 per template) was not sufficient for protecting the finger-
print template.
In terms of comparison to other similar systems, the works of Othman and Ross [59] and
Li and Kot [60] are considered. As summarized in Chapter 2, these two systems obtain
high identification and verification rates and much lower cross-link rates as desired;
however the bio-layering method proposed in this thesis does not have any requirements
such as the need to have compatible fingerprints or locate reference points.
In [59], Othman and Ross report a rank-1 accurracy of ∼85% and an EER of ∼6% on
a data set with a total of 500 fingers, obtained by mixing two different fingers from the
West Virginia University (WVU) dataset. In another experiment, where they mix two
different datasets (FVC 2002-DB2 A and WVU) creating a dataset of 200 test instances,
they report a rank-1 accurracy of ∼83% and an EER of ∼7%.
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In [60] the authors create a multi-biometric template by combining the minutia locations
of one finger with orientation information of another one. They use FVC 2002-DB2 A
for their experiments, and report the lowest error rates with FRR=6% at FAR=0.1%.
To evaluate privacy of their proposed methods, Li et al. define two types of attacks based
on their scheme: using the combined template to attack a database that contains (i) the
first fingerprint (using the minutiae location correlation) and (ii) the second fingerprint
(using the minutiae angle correlation). They call the two attacks Attack Type A and
Attack Type B respectively. Using FVC 2002-DB2 A and generating databases of 100
combined templates, they report 25% for Attack Type A and 57.5% rank-1 hits for Attack
Type B.
The bio-layering method superimposes the minutiae of two different templates on the
same coordinate system. As a result, the generated multi-biometric template might look
like a fuzzy vault with fewer minutia points, considering A as the primary template and
B as the chaff point set.
As one of the prevalent template protection methods, the fuzzy vault is well-studied in
terms of its practicality, security and privacy aspects [82]. The proposed technique may
have two advantages over the fuzzy vault. One advantage comes naturally due to the
multi-biometric use. However, the main advantage is that in the proposed scheme, the
verification does not reveal one of the two biometric templates with certainty.
To unlock a fuzzy vault, a sufficient quality probe template (A′) is provided by the user.
If a sufficient number of genuine points in the template are matched, the polynomial can
be reconstructed in some number of attempts. This in turn releases the secret encoded
in the polynomial. As a result, the matching minutiae points in A are identified as being
genuine, which constitutes an information leak.
In the bio-layering method, the secondary template B is analogous to the chaff points
in the fuzzy vault. While trying to remove A using A′, as ∆ = Σ − A′, the system
may incorrectly miss some minutiae points from A and remove some others from B.
Moreover, ∆ will be different every time a new A′ arrives. Since there is no way to fully
guarantee that the matched points belong to A or that the remaining points belong to
B, it is not possible to fully recover the constituent biometrics (see Section 5.3). That
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is why it can be claimed that the original templates are protected in a multi-biometric
vault.
The weakness of the proposed method against the fuzzy vault is that the secondary
template has a number of minutiae close to the size of the primary template. Since
there is no way to guarantee a full recovery of the primary template (as in fuzzy vault)
the secondary template that is used for hiding cannot be as large as the random set
created for a fuzzy vault, as the verification performance would be poorer (consider
FVC vs. NIST test results).
Another potential weakness is that if Σ is compromised, the attacker can break it into
two templates in a random manner, obtaining two dummy constituent templates C
and D. She can then use these two templates to break into the system, in unattended
scenarios. However, note that the attacker does not obtain the real fingerprints and the
success would be limited with Method2 or Method3 due to the replaced angles.
6.2 Conclusions
In this thesis a multi-biometric templates protection scheme is proposed for increased
performance, template security and enhanced privacy. In this work, two realizations
of this idea are demonstracted by combining two fingerprints in one realization and a
fingerprint and voice pass-phrase in the other one. In each case, three different methods
of constructing the multi-biometric template using fewer information of the constituent
fingerprints are evaluated in order to explore different performance and template security
levels; and a fourth method combining three biometric modalities.
Additionally, a fast and novel fingerprint matcher (TPS Matcher) has been developed
that can be adapted to situations where minutia angles don’t exist or might be ignored
(see Chapter 3).
The results showed that the proposed method (Method3) with two fingerprints pro-
vides near state-of-the-art verification performance on public databases. Furthermore,
it was shown that the proposed method is highly resistant to attacks where an adversary
might want to identify a person from a latent fingerprint or match users in two different
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databases (cross-correlation attack), while providing high genuine identification rates
(see Tables 5.7,5.6,5.9).
The alternative realization the multi-biometric template idea was provided by layering a
fingerpring with a spoken password (see Section 4.4), in order to explore the multi-modal
nature as well as to achieve cancelability. In this case, the system obtains very good
verification performance, but more modest template security and privacy enhancements.
In both cases, using a third biometric improves the success of the method (Method4).
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